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UNIDIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM: POWER AND
PERSPECTIVE IN COMMERCE
CLAUSE ADJUDICATION
Robert A. Schapirot & William W Buzbeett
Since 1995 the U.S. Supreme Court has applied a new form of rigorous
judicial scrutiny in assessing the constitutional limits of the Commerce
Clause, a provision that long has functioned as the central authorization of
congressional power. As critics on and off the bench have noted, the Court
has advanced its conception of federalism by requiring that the regulated
activity itself be economic or commercial in nature. A crucial aspect of the
Court's approach that has received less attention is the initial step of selecting
the relevant activity for constitutional analysis. One may view legislation
from a variety of different perspectives, and the choice of vantage points can
be critical in determining the requisite commercial nexus. In the wake of the
New Deal, the Court upheld legislation if it had a commercial connection
when viewed from any perspective. Professors Schapiro and Buzbee argue
that the Court recently broke from a half century of settled jurisprudence in
insisting on selecting a single perspective as determinative. This approach,
which they term "unidimensional, "relocates substantial discretion from Con-
gress to the judiciary. Drawing on the insights of recent scholarship on statu-
tory interpretation, Professors Schapiro and Buzbee illuminate the flaws in
the Court's unidimensional approach. In place of this unidimensional ap-
proach, the authors offer a "legislativist "framework, under which the text of
the legislation guides the judicial identification of the relevant activities for
purposes of Commerce Clause scrutiny.
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INTRODUCTION
Law, like any complex process, can be viewed from a multiplicity
of perspectives. In assessing legislation, one could focus on the issues
triggering political attention, the targets of the law, the intended ben-
eficiaries, the motives of the legislators, or the broader effects of the
legislation. In this regard, one can understand legal analysis as re-
fracting a legal text through a prism and assessing its various compo-
nents. Crucial to legal interpretation is determining which
perspectives matter and who gets to choose. Judicial review will pro-
duce markedly different outcomes if a court insists on designating a
preferred vantage point, rather than deferring to the approaches of
other constitutional actors. Much may turn on the selection of per-
spectives; great power lies in controlling that choice.
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Over the past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a nar-
row conception of legal analysis in several areas. This Article identi-
fies that judicial approach, which we term "unidimensional," and
demonstrates its centrality to the constitutional jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court, especially in the arena of federalism.' We develop
this argument through an examination of recent Commerce Clause
cases, in which the Court has deployed a unidimensional approach to
limit the exercise of congressional power. In breaking with a uniform
line of post-New Deal decisions and finding that Congress exceeded
its Commerce Clause authority, both United States v. Lopez2 and United
States v. Morrison3 placed great weight on whether the subject of regu-
lation was economic or noneconomic. 4 The potentially revolutionary
aspect of these cases, however, does not stem from the Court's con-
cern for locating a commercial or economic nexus. 5 Rather, it is the
Court's constrictive understanding of the perspective for assessing the
Commerce Clause connection that represents a new constraint on
congressional authority. In focusing narrowly on one target of the
I This Article builds on our prior works that draw on the insights of administrative
law and statutory interpretation to illuminate the Supreme Court's recent federalism and
public law jurisprudence, see William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000) [hereinafter Buzbee, One-Congress Fiction]; William W.
Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVrL. L. & PoL'Y F. 247 (2001) [here-
inafter Buzbee, Standing]; William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Re-
view, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001), as well as on our works that explore the appropriate
allocation of interpretive authority in the American constitutional system, see Robert A.
Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389 (1998);
Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitu-
tional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State
Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
2 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
4 See, e.g., id. at 613 ("[T]hus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Com-
merce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in na-
ture." (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60)).
5 ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinions in Morrison and Lopez,
generally refers to "economic," rather than commercial activity. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at
613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. Other Justices appear to use the terms "economic" and "com-
mercial" without distinction. See, e.g., Lopez, 529 U.S. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Some commentators have suggested that "economic activity" is generally the broader term,
but that the Court has expanded its understanding of "commerce" to the extent that the
two terms have become effectively synonymous in the Court's discourse. See Jesse H.
Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 843, 865 (2000) (asserting that the Court has to a great degree equated "commercial"
with "economic"); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 139, 159-60 (2001) (asserting that the Court has
defined "commercial activity" broadly to reach "economic activity"); see also Grant S. Nel-
son & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold
Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1,
109-10 (1999) (distinguishing between the broader term "economic" and the narrower
term "commercial"). This Article uses the two terms synonymously, except as expressly
indicated.
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legislation-for example, on the gun-toting student and the alleged
rapist-rather than on the intended beneficiaries, the ills triggering
legislative action, or the ripple effects of regulatory intervention, Lopez
and Morrison revived a skeptical form of rigorous judicial scrutiny.
The Court's groundbreaking and incompletely rationalized, method-
ological shift has led to lower court confusion regarding how to assess
Commerce Clause challenges to federal regulatory power.6
Commentators on and off the bench have criticized the Court's
fixation on the commercial/noncommercial distinction. 7 Without an
appreciation of the perspective issue, however, these criticisms lack an
essential component. It is difficult to deny the relevance of commerce
to the interpretation of a clause conferring authority to "regulate
Commerce."8 Of course, assessing the nexus to commerce remains an
important part of any construction of the Commerce Clause. The
problem lies not in the search for a commercial nexus, but in the
restricted field in which the Court is willing to search. Whether legis-
lation implicates commerce depends on what activities are recognized
and on the perspective from which an activity is viewed.9 The Court's
recent decisions suggest a manipulation of the perspective selection
and a preference for a vantage point that diminishes the commercial
connection.
Another recent case highlights the importance of the perspective
issue. In Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
(SWANCCQ,1' the Supreme Court addressed whether a federal regula-
tion controlling the development of wetlands exceeded the bounds of
the Commerce Clause. The Court ducked resolution of the constitu-
tional question, but characterized the federal government as acting at
the outer limits of its power."I The decision in SWANCC emphasized
the importance of identifying the proper focus. for applying the com-
mercial/noncommercial test, and strongly suggested that only a single
6 See infra Part I.F.
7 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 640, 642-45 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 656-57
(BreyerJ., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter,J., dissenting); id. at 627-29 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 618-25 (2001);
Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial
Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 220-22 (2000); Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1395-97 (1996).
8 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
9 Some scholars have noted the importance of characterizing the relevant activity for
purposes of Commerce Clause analysis. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United
States v. Lopez, 1995 Sue. C-r. REV. 125, 204-06;John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 209 (1998). This Article at-
tempts to provide a systematic account of the problem of determining the pertinent
perspective.
Io 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
11 See id. at 172-74.
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perspective could be valid, but failed to clarify the proper analysis for
ascertaining that preferred viewpoint.' 2 Similar issues have arisen in
other statutory contexts. For example, the federal Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 prohibits certain kinds of demonstra-
tions at abortion clinics. 13 In evaluating the constitutionality of the
Act, must a court choose a single activity for purposes of Commerce
Clause analysis, and if so, is the pertinent activity protesting, perform-
ing medical procedures, broader economic effects of blockades, or
some other array of implicated activities?' 4 The constitutionality of
this and other statutes may well turn on the perspective from which
the decision maker views the commerce question.
The Court's singular focus threatens to impose a newjudicial lim-
itation on the scope of federal legislative power. The adoption of mul-
tidimensionality represented a key component of the New Deal
Court's validation of the modern regulatory state. In landmark cases,
such as NLRB v. Jones &Laughlin Steel Corp.,15 the Court inaugurated a
new approach that accepted a variety of perspectives as sufficient to
validate statutes.16 The commercial effects of legislation, the commer-
cial implications of an underlying problem, as well as the commercial
nature of the regulatory target, all served as legitimate bases for the
exercise of federal power. This approach allowed Congress, rather
than the Court, to select the relevant commercial perspective. The
Court accepted any reasonable choice, and this broader framework
gave wide authority to Congress to craft national policy. The Rehn-
quist Court's unidimensional approach constitutes an implicit rejec-
tion of that deference.17
This singular focus links the Rehnquist's Court's Commerce
Clause cases with other aspects of its jurisprudence. With regard to
standing and the review of agency inaction, for example, the Court
has insisted on privileging the perspective of the apparent target of
12 See id. at 173 (" [W] e would have to evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. This is not clear .
13 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
14 Compare, e.g., United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (uphold-
ing the Act based on the effects of protesting and on the economic activity of providing
health services at clinics) with, e.g., id. at 269-70 (Weis, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
statute exceeded congressional authority because of the noncommercial nature of pro-
testing activity).
15 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
16 See, e.g., id. at 36-37.
17 This unidimensionalism isjust one example of what some critics have labeled a new
manifestation of 'Judicial supremacy." See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. Rv. 237,
240, 243-44 (2002) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's disregard for the strictures of the
political question doctrine reflects its broader conception of the judicial branch as the sole
legitimate source of federal authority to interpret substantive constitutional provisions).
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regulation.18 Under this emerging doctrine, a party can contest the
enforcement of a legal rule that constrains its conduct. In contrast,
the beneficiaries of actual or potential regulatory activity have much
less ability to challenge governmental conduct. This favoring of puta-
tive targets over beneficiaries tilts the field against active regulatory
policies.' 9 In this area, as in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Court's privileging of a single perspective impedes the exercise of fed-
eral regulatory authority.
This Article argues that the Court's search for a single, privileged
perspective is fundamentally misguided. The Rehnquist Court's
unidimensional approach constitutes a rejection of a consistent and
long accepted understanding of the proper relationship between
courts and legislatures. The Court's insistence on the coherence and
necessity of designating a single perspective represents an unjustified
interference with legislative prerogatives. Modern scholarship on leg-
islation, moreover, has suggested the inappropriateness and indeter-
minacy of the Court's project. This scholarship has demonstrated the
difficulty of rigidly separating the different legislative perspectives.
Many entities, for example, serve as both targets and beneficiaries of
regulations. Laws reflect multiple goals and compromises. The at-
tempt to single out a particular perspective as determinative will inevi-
tably be arbitrary. Accordingly, although proponents of a
unidimensional approach often assume the mantle of legal determi-
nacy, 20 their claims ring hollow. The Court's adoption of a single per-
18 As Cass Sunstein has argued, this favoring of putative targets over beneficiaries rep-
resents a return to the judicial mindset of the Lochnerperiod. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitu-
tionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 501-03 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Constitutionalism]; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 891-94 (1987)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy]; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434-36, 1480-81 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Stand-
ing]. The Lochner-era philosophy privileged common law baselines and viewed government
intervention as a rupture of the natural order. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra, at 874,
876-83. Sunstein built on the earlier work of the legal realists, who emphasized the gov-
ernment's role in defining legal relationships embodied in common law principles. See
J.M. Balkin, The Holhfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1124-25
(1990). The New Deal Court's rejection of Lochner recognized the artificiality of a privi-
leged legal status quo. In validating the modern regulatory state, the New Deal Court
acknowledged the parity of targets and beneficiaries of regulations. Governmental action
may burden some, but inaction will burden others. Moreover, the distinction between
action and inaction depends on the choice of perspectives. Only if the enforcement of
contract, property, and trespass laws is ignored can the economics of "laissez-faire" be un-
derstood to reflect the absence of governmental intervention. This Article broadens and
generalizes that critique as applied to the current Court.
19 See William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article
III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 766 (1997).
20 See Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829,
869-78 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL,JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTI-
TUTION: ERE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTI-
1204 [Vol. 88:1199
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spective does not lend greater certainty to the law; rather, it relocates
discretion from the legislature to the courts.
In place of the Court's narrow, unidimensional approach, this Ar-
ticle advances an alternate kind of review, which we term "legisla-
tivist." This legislativist approach acknowledges a role for judicial
scrutiny of congressional power, but also recognizes the need to af-
ford the legislature broad discretion in choosing the appropriate
method for utilizing its authority. To ascertain what activities are rele-
vant to a Commerce Clause challenge, courts should focus on the stat-
utory text with all of its complexities, rather than reduce each law to
some single, generalized subject. When exercising judicial review,
courts should not impose their preferred perspective instrumentally
to invalidate legislation. The commerce power belongs to Congress,
and as long as a statute has a reasonable nexus to commerce when
considered from some rational perspective, the Court may not substi-
tute its judgment for that of Congress. Under the legislativist model,
the courts would still administer the final exam, but Congress gets a
choice of questions.
Part I develops the concept of the "regulatory prism" to illustrate
the complex process through which legislatures produce statutes that
reflect multiple goals, purposes, and compromises. Part II employs
this concept of the regulatory prism as a framework for reexamining
the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence during the pre-
1937, 1937 to 1995, and post-1995 periods. It shows how, by insisting
on a quixotic search for a single regulatory goal motivating and justify-
ing a given act of federal intervention, Lopez and its progeny constitute
a decisive break with the previous half century of decisions. Building
on the insights of recent scholarship in administrative law and legisla-
tion, Part III demonstrates the arbitrariness inherent in the designa-
tion of a single perspective as determinative. The complexity of the
legislative process belies facile identification of a unitary activity, tar-
get, beneficiary, or purpose. Part IV contends that the Court's ap-
proach, while arbitrary, is not random. In a variety of areas, including
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court has focused on the com-
mon law right-holder as the fulcrum of its analyses. This framework
tilts the doctrine against regulation because it inevitably casts the state
as a suspect interloper. Part V outlines an alternative, "legislativist"
approach to judicial review. This method retains meaningful judicial
oversight, while avoiding the usurpation of legislative prerogative in-
herent in the Court's current unidimensional approach. Part V
thereby refutes the Court's claim that its approach is necessary to
avoid the abdication of judicial review.
ETH-CENTUR AMERICA (2000)) (discussing claims that the Court's current approach to
federalism is necessary to ensure principled decision making).
12052003]
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I
THE REGULATORY PRISM CONCEPTION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
In recent Commerce Clause cases, the Supreme Court has settled
on a single perspective as determinative. The Court has not defended
this unitary approach, nor has it acknowledged the variety of possible
perspectives for analyzing legislation creating new regulatory schemes.
Drawing on recent scholarship regarding the legislative process, this
Article suggests that the image of the "regulatory prism" provides a
useful framework for assessing legislation.2 1 The prism metaphor
helps to expose the shortcomings of the Court's current approach by
highlighting two key concepts.
First, legislation can be analyzed from multiple perspectives. The
Court's current approach does not recognize this multiplicity, nor
does it justify an active role by the judiciary in determining the rele-
vant perspective, as opposed to judicial deference to perspectives
identified by the legislature. Second, the various perspectives often
do not lend themselves to easy distinctions. The elements of legisla-
tion are positioned across a spectrum with indefinite boundaries. La-
bels such as "target" and "beneficiary" represent helpful ways of
understanding the inputs and outputs of the legislative process. In
many instances, though, rigidly distinguishing between targets and
beneficiaries may prove impossible. Legal rules that require categori-
zation of the different elements will entail uncertain and often arbi-
trary selections. To provide a framework for the discussion of
Commerce Clause cases in Part II, this Part briefly introduces the con-
cept of multiplicity. Part III provides an in-depth examination of the
problems of indeterminacy that plague the Court's approach.
This Part suggests that, rather than examining statutes to identify
a single relevant targeted activity, courts should view legislation and
the legislative process as a more complex array of actors, motivations,
and effects. Seldom is just one "activity" at issue in legislation, and
seldom does a law touch upon only one domain of regulation. We
suggest that conceiving of the legislative process as a "regulatory
prism" is both true to most modern conceptions of the legislative pro-
cess and a revealing way to recast the Supreme Court's shifting Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence. 22
The process of legislative enactment starts with some impetus for
a change from the status quo. Harms, social needs, interest group
entreaties, agency calls for legislative change, anticipated political
21 The "regulatory prism" also provides a useful account of the output of administra-
tive agencies, but this Article focuses on legislative enactments.
22 See infra Part III.A.
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gains, or any number of issues may lead legislators to consider ac-
tion.23 The initial impetus for legislative action can be analogized to a
ray of light directed at a triangular prism. That energy in turn is trans-
formed by an activated political process. Any such legislative process
will involve at least three groups of actors.
Politicians themselves, be they legislators, executive officers, or
regulators, will see potential benefits and harms in any given piece of
legislation. Strong proponents of public choice analysis suggest that
politicians are motivated by desire for votes or money,2 4 but for our
purposes it is enough to embrace a weak view of political motivation.
In order for a legislative proposal to gain traction, politicians will need
sufficient incentives to pursue legislative action. They typically will
seek to mediate among diverse (and often competing) stakeholders
and interested constituencies. 2 5 Politician motivation can be envi-
sioned as one point on a corner of the triangular prism, represented
by the point P on the diagram below. 26
The targets of regulation-those entities likely to be constrained
by the new law-will invariably be players in the legislative process. By
targets (sometimes called "objects"), we refer, for example, to indus-
tries that may be required to modify modes of production to comply
with environmental or occupational safety and health regulation.
Such targets will sit on another point of the triangular prism, repre-
sented by the point T.
Any legislation will generate some benefits (or, perhaps, reduc-
tion of harms) for a beneficiary class, represented by the third triangu-
lar point, B. Beneficiary classes can take many forms, such as workers
23 See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA'S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE,
JAMES MADISON THROUGH NEWT GINGRICH (2000) (exploring how legislators' particular
interests, constituent demands, beliefs and skills have influenced the political marks they
have left); ABNERJ. MiKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 57-100 (1997) (describing the legislative process).
24 See, e.g., FRED S. McCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLrIICIANS, RENT ExrRAcurION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (developing the theory that politicians will feign interest
in political actions to attract money and support from interest groups). See generally DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991) (reviewing and analyzing
central public choice tenets).
25 See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION passim (1974)
(positing that federal legislators act overwhelmingly to advance their reelection prospects);
see also MAYHEW, supra note 23 (exploring how legislators act with some autonomy from
interest group forces and can influence the course of public policy through their choices
and actions).
26 As this Article argues, legislative purpose is best understood as a spectrum of differ-
ent purposes. For every statute, each legislator, as well as the legislature as a whole, will
have a variety of different goals. See Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental States Relevant for Statutory
and Constitutional Interpretation, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1609, 1627 (2000) ("Legislators may
have views about what a specific provision accomplishes and broad attitudes about the
purposes of a law .... More precisely, one could talk of a spectrum extending from the
most immediate to the most ulterior objectives.").
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protected by workplace safety measures, citizens protected from high
levels of pollution by environmental protection laws, consumers pro-
tected from monopolistic merger activity by antitrust laws, or even en-
vironmental amenities protected by restrictions imposed on targets.
Once enacted, legislation creates a further array of possible costs and
benefits that can affect interests and entities beyond the most active
participants in the legislative process. That array of costs and benefits
of legislation, which this Article terms "effects," can be analogized to
the refracted light emanating from a prism in an array of colors of the
spectrum. The line between the gains of a beneficiary class and the
broader beneficial effects of legislation is surely a blurred one.
The regulatory prism concept can thus be envisioned in the fol-
lowing manner:
Impetus Effects
T B
This conceptualization of legislative motivation and legislative
partisans is necessarily incomplete. In particular, the actual array of
legislative players and motivations is far more complex,27 especially in
light of the battles waged to position items on the legislative agenda
and the political logrolling in which politicians negotiate simultane-
ously over the terms of multiple bills.28 Nevertheless, the idea that
27 Cf Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administra-
tive Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 431-32 (1989) (ex-
ploring the evolution of statutory debates over the Clean Air Act and the ways legislators
use procedural provisions to enhance the likelihood that implementation will accord with
their goals).
28 Indeed, given the far more complex reality, with multiple concerned groups and
politicians and parties with divergent goals, seeJ.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for
the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 passim (1996), a more accurate diagram might look
like a large knot. Nevertheless, the simplified schematic offered here acknowledges a mini-
mal and inevitably complex view of the legislative process and provides a more appropriate
1208 [Vol. 88:1199
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legislation will typically reflect at least these partisans' views and pur-
poses seems beyond debate. Laws seldom result from a legislator's
moment of insight realized in silent meditation. Seldom, also, will a
law be enacted that targets a harm if no one will perceive a benefit
from that law. Only irrational politicians would pursue an agenda
that creates only enemies.
We suggest that this simplified conception of the legislative pro-
cess helps to highlight both the significant changes in the Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause approach since 1995 and the reasons to
reject the unidimensional conception of legislation embedded in that
approach. As Part III discusses, this more nuanced view of the legisla-
tive process also sheds light on the Rehnquist Court's general ten-
dency to use manipulable and indeterminate analytical approaches
that empower courts to claim that there are single, determinate mean-
ings in statutory texts or legislative materials.
II
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE NEW DEAL
The regulatory prism provides a framework for understanding
the Court's evolving scrutiny of congressional power to regulate inter-
state commerce. Between 1937 and 1995, the Court utilized multiple
perspectives to find commerce clause connections sufficient to justify
the assertion of federal regulatory power. The Court's more restric-
tive view of congressional power in the pre-1937 and the post-1995
periods corresponds to a narrow focus on a single aspect of legisla-
tion. This Part traces these doctrinal developments in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, utilizing the regulatory prism framework to
highlight both the nature and implications of these substantial meth-
odological shifts.
A. The Purposes of the Commerce Clause
The historical context of the Commerce Clause provides a useful
background for considering the Court's recent interpretations. Al-
though accounts of the origins of the Commerce Clause vary, wide-
spread agreement exists that the promotion of commerce was a
central purpose of the Commerce Clause. One of the key concerns
that underlay the call for a constitutional convention was the problem
of states erecting barriers to commerce.2 9 These local impediments
framework than the unidimensional perspective increasingly adopted by the Supreme
Court.
29 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 Uames Madison); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Mean-
ing of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 146 (2001) (asserting that the purpose
underlying the Interstate Commerce Clause was the elimination of state trade barriers);
Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 5, at 21-25 (describing the Commerce Clause as part of a
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led to a perception of the need for centralized regulation to promote
the nascent national economy."'° The goal, in short, was to protect,
encourage, and maintain commerce. Commerce was the end, notjust
the means.
B. Unidimensionalism in the Pre-1937 Period
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Court's Commerce
Clause scrutiny focused narrowly on the target of legislation. This lim-
iting approach, coupled with the Court's categorical definition of ac-
tivities that did or did not constitute "commerce," resulted in a
restrictive interpretation of congressional power. To the extent that
the Court took cognizance of other legislative inputs, such as the mo-
tives of legislators, it used these factors to limit further congressional
authority. Over the first third of the twentieth century, new areas of
potential federal regulation, such as railways, placed stress on the
Court's restrictive, categorical approach. Finally, the Court broad-
ened its perspective and began to validate legislation whenever com-
merce appeared in any of the beams refracted through the regulatory
prism.
In the beginning of this period, the Court focused on categorical
definitions of activities that did or did not constitute "commerce."
The Court struck down legislation if it found that the regulated activ-
ity did not qualify as "commerce." Thus, if the Court deemed the tar-
get of regulation to be "manufacture," rather than "commerce,"
Congress had necessarily overstepped its authority. For example,
United States v. E. C. Knight Co. presented a question of the constitu-
tional scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act.31 The Court examined
whether preventing the monopolization of sugar refinement came
within congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. 32 Al-
though it acknowledged that the monopoly would affect interstate
commerce, the Court insisted on focusing on the activity targeted by
plan to remedy severe economic crisis resulting from the absence of national regulation);
see also Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federal-
ism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 641 (1995) (noting that Washing-
ton's letter transmitting the Constitution to Congress emphasized the regulation of
commerce as "one of the key purposes of the Constitution").
30 See, e.g., United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 620 (C.C.D. Mass. 1808) (No.
16,700) ("It is well understood, that the depressed state of American commerce, and com-
plete experience of the inefficacy of state regulations, to apply a remedy, were among the
great, procuring causes of the federal constitution."); THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (Alexander
Hamilton); Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does
the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 756 (2003); Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 5, at
21-25.
31 See 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
32 See id. at 11-12.
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the regulation, which it defined as the refinement of sugar.33 The
Court concluded that the refinement of sugar constituted "manufac-
ture," not "commerce," and, therefore, that it did not fall within the
ambit of the Interstate Commerce Clause.3 4 As Justice Harlan's dis-
sent emphasized, however, the Court could have focused instead on
the intended benefits of the legislation.35 By banning restraints on
trade, Congress sought to promote the free flow of commerce. From
the perspective of its intended effects, the legislation clearly consti-
tuted a regulation of interstate commerce. The then-prevailing manu-
facture/commerce dichotomy, however, yielded a singular judicial
focus on the regulatory target, to the exclusion of other aspects of the
legislation.3 6
In the pre-1937 period, the Court sometimes scrutinized the mo-
tives of the legislature as a way of providing a further check on con-
gressional authority. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court
considered a constitutional challenge to a federal statute prohibiting
the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor.3 7 The legis-
lation clearly concerned interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the
Court scrutinized the overall statutory scheme and concluded that the
Act did not in effect constitute a regulation of commerce, but instead
"aim [ed]" to prohibit child labor in manufacturing enterprises.3 8 Be-
cause of that prohibited legislative purpose, the Court held that the
Act did not come within Congress's Commerce Clause authority.39
Cases involving instrumentalities of commerce put great stress on
the Court's categorical distinctions. In this area, the Court softened
33 See id. at 12.
34 See id. at 11-13, 16-18.
35 See id. at 44-46 (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("A decree recognizing the freedom of com-
mercial intercourse as embracing the right to buy goods to be transported from one State
to another, without... unlawful restraints imposed by combinations of corporations or
individuals, . ..would tend to preserve the autonomy of the States, and protect the
people ....").
36 The Court did permit federal antitrust regulation to extend to conduct indicating
an intent to restrain interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106, 181-83 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 74-77 (1911); see
also Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1089, 1095-96 (2000) (discussing the Court's analysis' in the American Tobacco and
Standard Oil cases). One could understand these "intent" antitrust cases as indicating a
continuing focus on the target of regulation, as it was the target's intent that was
scrutinized.
37 See 247 U.S. 251, 268 & n.1 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
38 See id. at 271-72.
39 The Court purported to disclaim scrutiny of legislative motives, but it clearly under-
stood the ban on transportation as a means of accomplishing the prohibited goal of regu-
lating manufacture. See id. at 276; see also Young, supra note 5, at 148 & n.52 (discussing the
Court's analysis of legislative purpose as a means of identifying the contours of federal
power).
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its unidimensional approach to some extent.40 In cases involving the
regulation of railroads, most notably the Shreveport Rate Cases,4' the
Court permitted the regulation of activities that did not themselves
constitute interstate commerce, as long as the activities had an eco-
nomic impact on interstate commerce. 42 These cases emphasized that
Congress has the power to protect interstate commerce, even if the
source of the threat is solely intrastate activity. The Court allowed the
Commerce Clause inquiry to focus on the benefits of the regulation.
From that perspective, the connection to interstate commerce was ob-
vious. Consistent with this broader perspective, the Court upheld the
application of the federal Safety Appliance Acts to railroad cars used
in intrastate commerce. 43 The Court emphasized the "plenary" na-
ture of Congress's Commerce Clause authority and asserted that Con-
gress's power "competently may be exerted to secure the safety of...
persons and property transported.., and of those who are employed
in such transportation, no matter what may be the source of the dan-
gers which threaten it."44
A few months later, again in the railroad context, the Court vali-
dated a congressional Act by looking to the regulatory beneficiary of
that legislation. In the Second Employers' Liability Cases, the Court reit-
erated the principle that Congress could protect interstate commerce
no matter what the source of the danger. 45 The Court upheld the
federal Employers' Liability Act as applied to the negligence of rail-
road employees engaged in interstate commerce. 46 Insisting that con-
gressional power turned on the threat to interstate commerce, rather
than on the source of the threat, the Court criticized the opposing
view as a "mistaken theory, in that it treats the source of the injury,
rather than its effect upon interstate commerce, as the criterion of
congressional power."47 In the Shreveport Rate Cases, the Court ex-
tended this protective theory beyond the setting of safety regula-
tions.4s The Shreveport Rate Cases validated the federal power to
40 Robert Post has argued that the experience of federal control of the railways dur-
ing World War I demonstrated the need for integrated regulation of railroads and the
impossibility of maintaining wholly separate state and federal spheres. See Robert Post,
Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived"?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1550-55 (2002).
41 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
42 See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4.6, at
171-72 (6th ed. 2000).
43 See S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 23, 26-27 (1911).
44 Id. at 27.
45 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912).
46 See id. at 51-52.
47 Id. at 51.
48 See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). Grant
Nelson and Robert Pushaw, Jr. have emphasized the importance of the "protective princi-
ple," see Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 5, at 147-49, which they understand as the idea that
"Congress may protect the commerce it regulates by prohibiting noneconomic crimes or
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regulate some intrastate railroad rates as part of its regulation of inter-
state rates. 49 Building on the safety cases, the Court asserted that, at
least with regard to the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, Con-
gress had the power to regulate intrastate activity that threatened the
flow of interstate commerce. 50  In this particular area, the Court
adopted a multidimensional view of the Commerce Clause, allowing
legislation that benefited interstate commerce, even if the targeted ac-
tivity did not itself constitute interstate commerce. 51
In some other cases, the Court took a similarly broad approach in
determining what circumstances would make legitimate the exercise
of congressional Commerce Clause power. Specifically, the Court
used the perspective of the regulatory beneficiary to validate regula-
tion of activity that threatened the current of commerce. In Stafford v.
Wallace, for example, the Court upheld the Packers and Stockyards
Act of 1921, which authorized federal regulation of stockyards. 52 The
Court characterized the stockyards as a "throat through which the cur-
rent [of commerce] flows." 53 The Court then affirmed the power of
Congress to remove obstructions to that flow, without regard to
whether the obstructions could themselves be characterized as inter-
state commerce. 54 The Court asserted that the purpose of the legisla-
tive scheme-the removal of burdens on interstate commerce-
rather than the characterization of the regulated activity itself, was
dispositive. 55
In support of this focus on the benefits of the regulation rather
than the nature of the regulated activity, the Stafford Court quoted
broad language from an earlier case, United States v. Ferger, refuting the
contrary position.5 6 In Ferger, the Court had stressed the fallacy of
torts that interfere with or threaten such commerce," id. at 148 (citing United States v.
Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838)). They trace the principle to United States v. Coombs, in
which the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute punishing theft from shipwrecked com-
mercial vessels. See Coombs, 37 U.S. at 78-79; Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 5, at 148. It is
clear that at different times the Court has interpreted this power more or less broadly and
applied the principle to different categories of cases. A key to the development of the
Court's New Deal jurisprudence was its expansion of this protective theory beyond the
specific, limited categories of cases such as Coombs involving the regulation of instrumental-
ities of interstate commerce.
49 See Houston, E. & W Tex. Ry. Co., 234 U.S. at 349-50, 353.
50 See id. at 352-53. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Proper' Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1414-20 (1987) (discussing the Shreveport Rate Cases).
51 See Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59
HARV. L. REv. 645, 649-50 (1946) (noting the Court's broader view of congressional power
in cases concerning railroad regulation).
52 See 258 U.S. 495, 512, 516-17, 521, 528 (1922).
53 Id. at 516.
54 The "obstruction" consisted of unfair and monopolistic business practices by those
who controlled the stockyards. See id. at 514-15.
55 See id. at 518-21.
56 See id. at 521-22 (quoting United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199, 203 (1919)).
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considering only the direct target of the regulation: "[T] his mistak-
enly assumes that the power of Congress is to be necessarily tested by
the intrinsic existence of commerce in the particular subject dealt
with, instead of by the relation of that subject to commerce and its
effect upon it.''5 7 The Ferger Court insisted that Congress could regu-
late acts that "are not interstate commerce in and of themselves" as
long as those acts have an effect on interstate commerce. 58
Through 1936, however, these invocations of the congressional
power to protect interstate commerce had limited domains of applica-
tion. The Court employed a set of categorical distinctions that bound
the range of Congress's power to protect interstate commerce from
intrastate harms. These distinctions were based on two key sets of di-
chotomies, drawn from other areas of the Court's jurisprudence: the
direct/indirect effects doctrine and the public/private distinction. 59
The Court sought to draw a line between activities with "direct"
effects on commerce and those with mere "indirect" effects. 60 In eval-
uating Commerce Clause legislation, the Court would adopt the bene-
ficiary perspective only with regard to activities that it deemed to have
a sufficiently "direct" impact on commerce, such as the operation of
railroads. 61 In cases such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States52 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,I13 the Court struck down congres-
sional regulation of activities that the Court deemed to have at best an
"indirect" effect on interstate commerce. 64
The categories of direct and indirect effects and the related dis-
tinction between local and national conduct derived from the Court's
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.65 The Court, during the
pre-1937 period, adopted a view of state and federal regulation as mu-
tually exclusive in certain areas. Only in some domains did the Court
57 Ferger, 250 U.S. at 203. The Court continued:
We say mistakenly assumes, because we think it clear that if the proposition
were sustained it would destroy the power of Congress to regulate, as obvi-
ously that power, if it is to exist, must include the authority to deal with
obstructions to interstate commerce and with a host of other acts which,
because of their relation to and influence upon interstate commerce, come
within the power of Congress to regulate, although they are not interstate
commerce in and of themselves.
Id. (citation omitted).
58 See id. at 203-04.
59 See Cushman, supra note 36, at 1113-14, 1127-28.
60 See id. at 1116-22.
61 See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 42, § 4.6, at 171-72.
62 See 295 U.S. 495, 548-50 (1935).
63 See 298 U.S. 238, 307-11 (1936).
64 See id.; 295 U.S. at 548-50.
65 See Cushman, supra note 36, at 1113-14; David E. Engdahl, Casebooks and Constitu-
tional Competency, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741, 762 (1998) (book review); Lessig, supra note 9,
at 146.
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countenance concurrent state and federal regulation. 66 In other ar-
eas, the Court understood the Commerce Clause to mark the bound-
ary between state and federal authority. With regard to these areas, if
the Commerce Clause permitted the federal government to regulate
an activity, then the negative implications of the Commerce Clause
prohibited state regulation.67 Recognizing the power of Congress to
regulate in such areas thus created a zone immune from state control.
The principle of exclusive spheres ofjurisdiction, sometimes denomi-
nated "dual federalism, "68 created pressure to limit the sweep of con-
gressional power. By restricting federal authority, the Court's
categorical approach empowered state regulation. Hence, the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence during this period did not necessa-
rily reflect broad antiregulatory views; rather, judicial recognition of
federal power meant the exclusion of state regulatory authority. 69
Barry Cushman has emphasized that the public/private distinc-
tion, drawn from the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence,
also served as a check on congressional Commerce Clause power.70
The Court deemed railroads, other common carriers, and certain
other businesses to be "affected with a public interest";71 with regard
to these enterprises, the Court allowed Congress to reach activities
with commercial effects. 72 Indeed, the Court exhibited great defer-
ence to congressional judgment concerning the need for regulation
of such businesses. 73 Activities of a private nature, by contrast, gener-
ally stood outside congressional authority.7 4 Moreover, the public/
private distinction operated in tandem with the direct/indirect effects
dichotomy. Even if the regulated entity qualified as "affected with a
public interest, '7 5 Congress could not reach activities that had only
66 See Cushman, supra note 36, at 1114-16.
67 See id. at 1124-25.
68 For discussions of dual federalism and its decline in the Commerce Clause context,
see Young, supra note 5, at 142-52; Engdahl, supra note 65, at 761-72. See also Post, supra
note 40, passim (employing the term "dual sovereignty" to express the concept of separate
and exclusive spheres of state and federal authority).
69 See Cushman, supra note 36, at 1121 & n. 150; see also Edward S. Corwin, The Passing
of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 22 (1950) (noting that the Commerce Clause could
inhibit state regulatory power). But cf Post, supra note 40, at 1630 ("The Taft Court was a
very conservative institution, with an ingrained aversion to government regulation.").
70 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CON-
STITUTIONAL REvOLUTION 143-47 (1998).
71 See id. at 144.
72 See id. at 143-44.
73 See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922) ("Whatever amounts to more
or less constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of
interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce
clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger and
meet it.").
74 See CUSHMAN, supra note 70, at 143-44.
75 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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"indirect" effects on commerce. 76 The various formal boundaries
drawn by the Court limited the application of a multidimensional
approach.
C. The Revolution of 1937: The Prism Revealed
In 1937, the Court generalized the multidimensional approach
reflected in the railroad and current of commerce cases. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. concerned the application of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 to a plant that manufactured steel. 77 Un-
like railroads, the plant did not function as an instrumentality of inter-
state commerce. Production in the plant could plausibly have been
characterized as part of the current of commerce or as exercising a
direct effect on interstate commerce. In Jones & Laughlin, however,
the Court cited the railroad and stream of commerce cases for the
general proposition that Congress could enact legislation to protect
interstate commerce.78 The Court used the language of the prior
cases, but detached the basic principles from their previously limited
context.79 In a crucial passage, the Court affirmed the general con-
gressional power to regulate based on the resulting benefits to
commerce:
We do not find it necessary to determine whether these fea-
tures of defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the.
"stream of commerce" cases. The instances in which that metaphor
has been used are but particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of
the protective power which the government invokes in support of
the present act. The congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transac-
tions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a "flow" of
interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be
due to injurious action springing from other sources. The funda-
mental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the
power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for its "protection or
advancement"; to adopt measures "to promote its growth and insure
its safety"; "to foster, protect, control, and restrain." That power is
plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no matter what
the source of the dangers which threaten it."81
76 See Cushman, supra note 36, at 1133.
77 See 301 U.S. 1, 22 (1937).
78 See id. at 36-37.
79 See Epstein, supra note 50, at 1446 ("[T]he Court in effect borrowed the language
of those cases concerned with the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and applied it
generally, as if the original subject-matter restriction had not been integral to the earlier
decisions." (citation omitted)).
80 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36-37 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Barry
Cushman has argued that Jones & Laughlin was an incremental rather than revolutionary
advance in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. For instance, he emphasizes that
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Jones & Laughlin thus synthesized a broad principle of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. Rather than dividing congres-
sional power into various rigidly defined categories, the Court recog-
nized Congress's general authority to protect, sustain, and otherwise
affect interstate commerce through regulation. Congress had power
to grease the skids of commerce, not merely the power to act where
the "particular subject dealt with" was itself imbued with commerce.8 '
The instrumentality cases and the current of commerce cases became
mere examples of this more general theory.82 The Court thus ex-
pressed its willingness to accept a broad, multidimensional approach
to congressional authority in all areas of its Commerce Clause juris-
prudence. During this same period, the Court lost confidence in the
categorical distinctions that previously had limited the scope of the
multidimensional approach.8 3
Subsequent cases reiterated the general reach of congressional
power. In United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., for instance, the Court
declared directly: "The commerce power is not confined in its exer-
cise to the regulation of commerce among the states. '8 4 Rather, the
power extended to regulation of intrastate activities as a means to the
desired end of regulating interstate commerce.8 5 Along these lines,
Wrightwood Dairy cited the maxim stated in the Second Employers' Liabil-
ity Cases, a railroad regulation decision: "It is the effect upon interstate
commerce or upon the exercise of the power to regulate it, not the
source of the injury which is the criterion of [congressional] power." 86
Wrightwood Dairy concerned the regulation of milk prices, not a rail-
road or other instrumentality of commerce. 87 The principle had by
the opinion reflected the influences of the prior stream of commerce theories. See
CUSHMAN, supra note 70, at 168-76. Regardless of whether one dates the fundamental
transformation to Jones & Laughlin or to United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), it is clear that the Court was moving toward an
adoption of a general protective principle based on a synthesis of the Court's previous
Commerce Clause cases.
81 See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922) (noting the mistake of "'as-
sum [ing] that the power of Congress is to be necessarily tested by the intrinsic existence of
commerce in the particular subject dealt with, instead of by relation of that subject to
commerce and its effect upon it"' (quoting United States v. Ferger, 250 U.S. 199, 203
(1919))).
82 See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 36 (stating that it is "not ... necessary to
determine whether these features of defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy
to the 'stream of commerce' cases").
83 See CUSHMAN, supra note 70, at 170 (describing the erosion of the Court's categori-
cal distinctions); see also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 228-33
(2000) (discussing Wickards rejection of contemporaneous categories of Commerce
Clause analysis).
84 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
85 See id.
86 Id. at 121 (citing The Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912)).
87 See id. at 115-17.
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this time become generalized. In exercising its commerce power,
Congress was not limited to regulating activity that itself constituted
interstate commerce. Congress could base its authority on the nature
of the benefits to commerce, rather than on the characteristics of the
target of the regulation. Wickard v. Filburn famously summarized this
focus on the regulatory beneficiary and the irrelevance of the nature
of the regulatory target:
[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,
and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."s8
In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co. ,Justice
Rutledge, writing for the Court, emphasized and defended the
Court's generalizing of the theories first advanced in such railroad
cases as the Shreveport Rate Cases.8 9 Justice Rutledge described the for-
mulation of the Shreveport doctrine as "a great turning point in the
construction of the [Commerce Clause]."°° He characterized the gen-
eralization of the Shreveport approach as an inevitable development in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence:
Once applied to transportation and the Interstate Commerce Acts,
it was inevitable that the approach would be extended to the pro-
ductive and industrial phases of the national economy and the stat-
utes regulating them, including the Sherman Act. Time and events
were disclosing ever more clearly the impact of their effects upon
interstate trade and commerce. And this was posing the same ne-
cessity for regulation as in the field of transportation, in order to
protect and preserve the national commerce and carry out Con-
gress' policy regarding it.9 1
This understanding of a unified commerce power prevailed al-
most until the end of the twentieth century. The Court consistently
upheld congressional legislation aimed at protecting or promoting in-
terstate commerce without regard to the nature of the direct subject
of the regulation. The Court continued to act on the theory, first de-
veloped with regard to railroads and then applied more generally,
that Congress could address threats to interstate commerce, even if
the source of the threats or the benefited parties did not themselves
constitute or engage in interstate commerce. 9 2 In all areas of its juris-
prudence, the Court insisted that benefits to interstate commerce jus-
88 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (emphasis added).
89 See 334 U.S. 219, 231-33 (1948).
90 Id. at 232.
91 Id. at 232 n.ll.
92 In 1981, the United States Supreme Court summarized this longstanding view as
follows:
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tified congressional regulation. Moreover, the Court consistently
rejected the position that activity subject to regulation must itself be
characterized as interstate commerce in order for the regulation to be
valid.93 The multidimensional approach appeared deeply embedded
in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
During this period, the Court also disclaimed the authority to re-
view the motives of Congress in enacting Commerce Clause legisla-
tion. United States v. Darby overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and insisted
that legislative purpose could not serve to undermine Commerce
Clause authority.9 4 In later cases challenging civil rights laws, the
Court acknowledged the possibility of multiple congressional pur-
poses. 95 As in Darby, the existence of noncommercial purposes did
not doom the legislation at issue in those cases.9 6
D. Return of Unidimensionality
In 1995, the Supreme Court began limiting the scope of Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority. The Court refused to accept the
multidimensional approach and instead picked out individual per-
spectives as the sole possible basis for validating congressional action.
In so doing, the Court began to detach Jones & Laughlin and its prog-
eny from their broad roots so as to narrow the scope of congressional
power. By separating the various precedential strands joined in Jones
& Laughlin, the Court undertook to limit Congress's ability to regu-
The denomination of an activity as a "local" or "intrastate" activity does not
resolve the question whether Congress may regulate it under the Com-
merce Clause .... [T] he commerce power "extends to those activities intra-
state which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of
Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted
power to regulate interstate commerce."
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981) (quoting
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)). Hodel thus echoed the
classic statement of the scope of congressional commerce power in Gibbons v. Odgen, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-97 (1824).
93 See, e.g., id. at 277 ("'[E]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be
regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly
situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.'" (quoting Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975))).
94 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941), overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). As the Darby Court noted:
The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters
for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution
places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control....
Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not
infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power con-
ferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 115.
95 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1964).
96 See, e.g., id. at 257 ("That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs... ren-
dered its enactments no less valid.").
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late conduct that substantially affected interstate commerce. In United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, the Court compartmental-
ized its prior Commerce Clause cases to confine the broad language
of the transportation cases. 97 The achievement of Jones & Laughlin
had been to generalize the commerce-protecting theory of the trans-
portation cases and to apply that principle more broadly in other fac-
tual contexts. 98 In Lopez and Morrison, the Court sought to dissolve the
principle articulated in Jones & Laughlin. In short, unidimensionality
had returned.
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court built on language from Perez v.
United States99 and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n,t 0 two earlier Commerce Clause cases.' 0 ' In Perez, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute criminaliz-
ing "loan sharking.' 112 Although each individual instance of loan
sharking might occur within a single state, the Court upheld the stat-
ute, deferring to Congress's judgment that, in the aggregate, extor-
tionate credit transactions did affect interstate commerce. 0 3 Perez set
forth the three-part categorization of Commerce Clause cases that has
become central to the Court's approach. Perez asserted that "[t]he
Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems.
First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which
Congress deems are being misused . . . .Second, protection of the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... or persons or things in
commerce .... Third, those activities affecting commerce."' 0 4 This
categorization divided the different strands that the Court had
brought together in Jones & Laughlin.'0 5 Although Perez identified the
different strands, it did not state that these categories constitute the
totality of the commerce power,10 6 nor did it imply that each category
had special principles that were inapplicable to the other categories.
In this regard, Perez did not constitute a sharp break with the post-
1937 tradition of Commerce Clause analysis.
97 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-09 (2000) ("[M]odern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence has 'identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may reg-
ulate under its commerce power."' (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 558 (1995))); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-559.
98 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
99 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
100 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
lo See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-58.
102 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 149-50.
103 See id. at 154-57.
104 Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
105 See supra Part ll.B-C (discussing the pre-New Deal Court's categorical Commerce
Clause analysis and the subsequent rise of multidimensional analysis culminating in Jones
& Laughlin).
106 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 150 ("The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three catego-
ries of problems." (emphasis added)).
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Hodel concerned the constitutionality of congressional regulation
of strip mining.107 Although a given mining operation might take
place solely in one state, the Court asserted that Congress could regu-
late the activity as a means toward reaching interstate commerce. 10 8
Hodel thus reiterated the principle that it is the interstate commercial
effects of an activity that render it subject to congressional regulation,
without regard to the characteristics of the activity itself. The Court
repeated the three-part Commerce Clause categorization, but again
gave no indication that the categories were exclusive. 10 9
In Lopez, the three-part categorization began to assume talismanic
significance. 10 For the first time in over fifty years, the Court treated
the categories as exclusive. The Lopez Court posited that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 did not fit into the first two categories cover-
ing regulation of the channels of interstate commerce and the protec-
tion of instrumentalities of interstate commerce or things in interstate
commerce. 1' The Court then stated: "Thus, if [the law] is to be sus-
tained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activ-
ity that substantially affects interstate commerce."'11 Rather than
mere general descriptions of the broad scope of Congress's Com-
merce Clause authority, the categories had thus become restrictive
definitions of that scope. In earlier cases, the categories had repre-
sented particular applications of broader Commerce Clause princi-
ples. Membership in one of the categories had been sufficient to
ensure validation, but the Court had never explicitly required such
membership as a necessary prerequisite to constitutionality. 13 In Lo-
pez, the Court construed membership in one of the three categories as
a necessary condition of the legitimate exercise of congressional Com-
merce Clause power. 14
107 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268-72
(1981).
108 See id. at 281; supra note 92.
109 See id. at 276-77 ("[T]his Court has made clear that the commerce power extends
not only to 'the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce' and to 'protection of
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... or persons or things in commerce,' but
also to 'activities affecting commerce."' (alteration in original) (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at
150)).
110 See 514 U.S. 549, 553-59 (1995).
111 See id. at 559.
112 Id. The Lopez Court also added the term "substantially" to the formulation of the
"affecting commerce" category. See id. (concluding that the proper construction of the
standard is "substantially affect[ing]" commerce (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ho-
del and Perez had stated the standard as "'activities affecting commerce,"' without the more
demanding substantiality component. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at
150).
113 See supra notes 106, 109 and accompanying text.
114 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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The Lopez Court also suggested new limits on the kinds of activi-
ties that could be reached under Congress's authority to regulate con-
duct substantially affecting interstate commerce. After stating that the
challenged enactment had to fall into one of the enumerated catego-
ries, the Court suggested that congressional authority to reach activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce extends only to the regu-
lation of economic activity.1 15 The Court restated its prior case law in
this restrictive fashion: "[W]e have upheld a wide variety of congres-
sional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity. . . ." 1"6 The Court
then emphasized that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate
economic activity.' 17
The Court's assertion that Congress can reach only economic ac-
tivity that substantially affects interstate commerce stood in tension
with the language of Wickard v. Filburn. In Wickard, the Court had
stated that, "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."' I8 Rather than confronting this language, the Lopez ma-
jority insisted that the facts of Wickard, concerning wheat production,
supported the notion that Congress could reach only economic activ-
ity. 1 l9 By recasting Wickard in this manner, the Court began to dis-
mantle the core of the post-1937 revolution in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. The previously recognized congressional power to reg-
ulate activity based on its substantial effect on interstate commerce
reflected the triumph of the perspective of the regulatory beneficiary.
Under this test, congressional power depended not on the characteris-
tics of the activity subject to regulation, but on the resulting effects on
interstate commerce. In Lopez, however, the Court turned the inquiry
on its head and shifted the focus back to the regulatory target. The
Lopez Court insisted that the nexus with commerce be evaluated from
the perspective of the regulated entity. 120 Instead of focusing on the
commercial benefits of the regulation, the Court examined only the
direct object of regulation.
United States v. Morrison continued this unidimensional ap-
proach.' 2 1 The Morrison Court analyzed whether the civil enforce-
ment provisions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 fit into
115 See id. at 559-60.
16 Id. at 559.
117 See id. at 561-68.
118 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
119 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 ("Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity
in a way that the possession of a gtun in a school zone does not.").
120 See id. at 561, 567.
121 See 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
1222 [Vol. 88:1199
UNIDIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM
any of the three Commerce Clause categories. When the Court con-
cluded that the Act could not be brought within any of these rubrics,
it invalidated the statute. 22 The Court also asserted the centrality of
the principle expressed in Lopez that only economic activity falls within
the scope of Congress's power to regulate activity substantially affect-
ing commerce.123 The Court stressed that "[g]ender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activ-
ity."1 2 4 The Court stopped just short of asserting a categorical rule
that the regulated activity must be economic. However, the Court left
no doubt about the high, likely insuperable hurdle facing any argu-
ment that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity based on its
effects on interstate commerce. 2 5
Lopez and Morrison thus indicated that the economic nature of the
regulated activity figures centrally in the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis. Under these decisions, the perspective of the regulatory tar-
get gained preeminence. The Court appeared unwilling to focus on
commercial benefits, commercial aspects of the problems triggering
legislative action, or other commercial implications of a challenged
statute.
Lopez and Morrison also sought to resurrect the local/national dis-
tinction that the Court had employed in the pre-1937 period. 126 The
Court in Lopez and Morrison insisted on the necessity of maintaining
separate spheres of local and national authority. In support of this
principle, the Court invoked a quotation from Jones & Laughlin warn-
ing against "'obliterat[ing] the distinction between what is national
and what is local." ' 127 As discussed above, at the time of Jones &
Laughlin, the Commerce Clause did embody such a distinction. 2 In
certain areas, the affirmative implications of the Clause and the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause marked separate areas of exclusive jurisdic-
tion. A broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause at that time
disabled state regulatory authority, even in the absence of congres-
sional intervention. 29 In the Court's modern jurisprudence, how-
122 See id. at 609, 613-19. The petitioners in Morison had not contended that the
legislation in question fell under the first two categories. See id. at 609.
123 See, e.g., id. at 610 ("[A] fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal
nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case.").
124 Id. at 613.
125 See id. ("While we need not adopt a categorical nile against aggregating the effects
of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history
our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature.").
126 See id. at 608 & n.3, 617-18; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557, 567 (1995).
127 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Coip., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937)).
128 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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ever, the Commerce Clause no longer demarcates such an
impermeable border. 130 The states and the federal government now
enjoy extensive areas of jurisdictional overlap.131 The fear of exclud-
ing subject areas from state supervision by upholding federal authority
no longer dogs the Commerce Clause. In this regard, the Court's res-
urrection of the local/national distinction is an anachronism, a throw-
•4back to the bygone era of dual federalism. 132
The Court has not embraced unambiguously the unidimensional
approach, but its recent decisions point in that direction. Following
Morrison, the Court decided two other significant Commerce Clause
cases on statutory grounds. In both instances, the Court cited consti-
tutional concerns as a reason for adopting a narrow construction of
the statute at issue. While interpreting the federal arson statute nar-
rowly, Jones v. United States suggested that the Court might acknowl-
edge a variety of perspectives in analyzing the scope of the Commerce
Clause power. 133 In Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC), however, the Court returned to its unidimen-
sional approach. 134
In the Jones decision, announced one week after Morrison, the
Court considered the application of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the federal
arson statute, to the destruction of a private dwelling. 35 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the language of
the statute limited its scope to the destruction of property "used" in
interstate commerce.'13 6 The statute did not employ the broader lan-
guage of "affecting commerce."' 137 Justice Ginsburg asserted that,
given the "used in commerce" language of the statute, the law re-
quired an analysis of the function of the building targeted and a deter-
mination of whether that function affected interstate commerce. 138
She concluded that the house at issue served merely as a private resi-
130 See Post, supra note 40, at 1637 ("[T] he Taft Court's jurisprudence of congressional
power was underwritten by complex congeries of very specific historical perspectives, all of
which were to be radically modified during the New Deal era.").
131 See Young, supra note 5, at 150.
132 See Post, supra note 40, at 1638 ("We cannot resurrect pre-New Deal federalism
without also resurrecting dual sovereignty."). Of course, a broad grant of Commerce
Clause authority does enable Congress to interfere with state regulation. The Supremacy
Clause gives Congress exclusive jurisdiction if it chooses to exercise its power. See U.S.
CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Recognizing the ability of Congress to regulate in an area, however,
no longer automatically ousts states.
133 See 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
'-34 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
135 Jones, 529 U.S. at 850.
136 See id. at 853-54.
137 See id. at 854.
38 See id. at 854-55 (citing United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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dence. 39 This absence of commercial function placed the building
outside of the scope of the statute. 140
Although the Court in Jones found that the arson statute did not
apply in the case at bar, the statutory test that the opinion advanced
could have quite an expansive reach. By reviewing the function of the
building subject to arson, the Court suggested a Commerce Clause
inquiry not limited to a single dimension. That is, in emphasizing the
purpose of the house, the Court in effect evaluated the statute based
on the commercial benefits of the law, specifically whether the law was
protecting a building involved in commerce. Notably, the Court did
not focus on whether the activity of throwing a Molotov cocktail
through the window of the house should be characterized as commer-
cial in nature. By assessing the purpose of the house, rather than the
nature of the criminal act, the Court implied a Commerce Clause
framework that looks beyond the direct targets of the regulation.
Justice Ginsburg employed this broad approach to interpret the
statute, not to evaluate the statute's validity as an exercise of congres-
sional commerce power; nonetheless, the opinion strongly suggested
that its analysis would also satisfy the Commerce Clause test. Justice
Ginsburg emphasized that the statute used language more restrictive
than the constitutional standard. 14 1 She also cited the canon of con-
struing statutes so as to avoid serious constitutional questions.1 42
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg quoted approvingly Judge Friendly's opin-
ion in United States v. Mennuti.143 In Mennuti, the Second Circuit inter-
preted the federal arson statute as not extending to arson of a private
dwelling. 144 Writing for the panel, Judge Friendly suggested that the
commercial effects of an act of arson could provide the necessary
commercial nexus for purposes of the Commerce Clause. 145 The po-
tentially broad implications of Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in
Jones led Justice Thomas to write a separate concurrence, joined by
Justice Scalia, in which he sought to reserve the issue of whether the
commercial use of a building, and thus the commercial effects of an
arson, were sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause analysis. 146
139 See id. at 856.
140 See id. at 855-857.
141 See id. at 854 (contrasting the statutory phrase "used in" commerce with the
broader standard of "affecting" commerce).
142 See id. at 857 (citing United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
143 See id. at 854 (quoting United States v. Mennuti, 639 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1981)).
144 See Mennuti, 639 F.2d at 113.
145 See id. at 110 ("Congress did not define the crime described in [the federal arson
statute] as the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate
commerce as we assume it could constitutionally have done.").
146 See 529 U.S. at 860 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In joining the Court's opinion, I
express no view on the question whether the federal arson statute, as there construed, is
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In contrast to Jones, the Court's five-to-four decision in SWANCC
suggested a restrictive approach to Commerce Clause interpretation
consistent with the framework applied in Lopez and Morrison, albeit
with a new revelation of the risk of judicial manipulation of perspec-
tives. 147 In SWANCC, the Court considered the authority of the Army
Corps of Engineers to regulate a landfill.1 48 Twenty-three cities and
villages in the suburbs of Chicago had purchased land for the purpose
of disposing of solid waste.' 49 Because the creation of the disposal site
required the filling of permanent and seasonal ponds that helped to
support several species of migratory birds, the issue arose as to
whether a permit was required under the Clean Water Act.' 5 1 The
Corps eventually asserted regulatory authority based on its "Migratory
Bird Rule," which interpreted the Clean Water Act as extending to
waters used by migratory birds.' 5 '
The Supreme Court ultimately decided the case on statutory
grounds. The Court held that the presence of migratory birds did not
bring isolated wetlands within the scope of the statute.' 52 To support
its interpretation of the Clean Water Act, which exhibited considera-
ble tension with earlier constructions of the statute,' 53 the Court em-
phasized the canon of construing statutes so as to avoid constitutional
questions. 15 4 The Court made clear its concern that the Migratory
constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial activities." (citation
omitted)); cf Young, supra note 5, at 160-61 (asserting that Jones "made clear that many
forms of arson . . . remain within the reach of the federal commerce power").
147 For discussions of SWANCC and its relation to the Court's Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, see Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federal-
ism, 9 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 215-21, 237 (2001); Christy H. Dral &JerryJ. Phillips,
Commerce by Another Name: Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Gibbs, 31 ENVrL. L. REP. 10413,
10419-20 (2001); William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution:
SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10741 (2001); Michael S. Greve, Business, the States,
and Federalisms Political Economy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 895, 908-11 (2002); Eric R.
Coulson, Casenote, Bird Hotels: Are the Resting Spots of Migratory Birds Entitled to Federal Gov-
ernment Protection Through the Commerce Clause? Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), 26 S. ILL. U. LJ. 575, 576-78
(2002); MichelleJ. Taylor, Note, Solid Waste Agency Northern Cook County v. Army Corps
of Engineers: The United States Supreme Court Invalidates the Migratory Bird Rule and Raises
Questions About the Commerce Clause, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 301, 311-21 (2002).
148 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001).
'49 Id. at 162-63.
150 See id. at 163-64.
151 See id. at 164.
152 See id. at 168.
153 See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133-35 (1985)
(construing broadly the scope of the Clean Water Act).
154 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172-73 (citing EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
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Bird Rule might exceed the authority granted to the national govern-
ment by the Commerce Clause. 15 5
The Court's concern about constitutional boundaries is surpris-
ing, given the regulations' substantial commercial nexus. The activity
prohibited by the Migratory Bird Rule was a municipal landfill,156
which appears to be a clear example of a commercial enterprise. The
regulations were intended to protect birds that travel across state lines
and that are central to a multibillion dollar industry of hunting and
bird watching.1 5 7 To create constitutional uncertainty, the Court had
to suggest a potentially very narrow perspective:
Respondents argue that the "Migratory Bird Rule" falls within Con-
gress' power to regulate intrastate activities that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce. They note that the protection of migratory
birds is a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude," and
that, as the Court of Appeals found, millions of people spend over a
billion dollars annually on recreational pursuits relating to migra-
tory birds. These arguments raise significant constitutional ques-
tions. For example, we would have to evaluate the precise object or
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com-
merce. This is not clear, for although the Corps has claimed juris-
diction over petitioner's land because it contains water areas used as
habitat by migratory birds, respondents now, post litem motam, focus
upon the fact that the regulated activity is petitioner's municipal
landfill, which is "plainly of a commercial nature." But this is a far
cry, indeed, from the "navigable waters" and "waters of the United
States" to which the statute by its terms extends.' 58
This language represents a rather extreme form of the avoidance ca-
non. Not only did the Court avoid reaching the constitutional ques-
tion, but it also avoided defining the constitutional issue clearly. This
portion of the opinion, featuring pronouns of uncertain reference
("this"), appears willfully obscure. The passage does make clear that
the Court will scrutinize closely the "object or activity" that is claimed
to affect substantially interstate commerce. 15" The opinion further
suggests skepticism about the constitutionality of regulating this kind
of landfill. The source of that constitutional skepticism, however, re-
mains elusive. The Court acknowledges in the above passage the ar-
gument that the landfill is commercial. The Court also notes the
commercial effects of the regulation: protecting migratory birds helps
sustain a billon-dollar industry. From the perspective of either the tar-
155 See id. at 174 (stating that the assertion of federal regulatory authority raised "signif-
icant constitutional questions").
156 See id. at 162-63.
157 See id. at 195 & n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 173 (citations omitted).
159 See id.
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get or the beneficiary of the regulation, the nexus to commerce ap-
pears ample. So what issue gives rise to the Court's constitutional
doubts? Rather than clarifying the question, the passage's final sen-
tence stands as a non sequitur. Perhaps the statute does not reach the
landfill at issue, but the Court has done nothing to explain why the
boundaries of the Commerce Clause demand a limiting construction.
Prior to the Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison, the commer-
cial attributes of either the migratory birds or the landfill would have
sufficed to validate the regulation. Given the Court's new unidimen-
sional approach, however, matters are not so certain. Perhaps the
landfill's effects on migratory birds are too attenuated.160 Perhaps a
municipal landfill is not really commercial. Perhaps it is the water in
the threatened ponds itself that must be analyzed to ascertain the re-
quired commercial nexus.161 The Court does not clarify any of these
issues, but the unidimensional approach enables it later to strike
down the regulation on any of these grounds. The Court's ability to
choose a single perspective gives it great discretion to find the weakest
Commerce Clause link. 162 The choice of the "precise object or activ-
ity" affecting commerce 163 is critical, but the Court gives no indication
of how the choice should be made. SWANCC evokes the possibility of
interpretive three-card monte. If the player reaches for one perspec-
tive, the Court can always choose another. From 1937 to 1995, any of
the possible perspectives would have sufficed. But Congress must now
find the right card, and the Court keeps the cards face down.
Unidimensionality may constrain Congress, but it unleashes the
Court.
160 See Funk, supra note 147, at 10769-70.
161 Compare Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Con-
gress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 890 (2002) (asserting that
"the object regulated [in SWANCC] is the intrastate water"), with Marianne Moody Jen-
nings & Nim Razook, United States v. Morrison: Where the Commerce Clause Meets Civil Rights
and Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A Point and Counterpoint from a Constitutional and Social Per-
spective, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 54 (2000) (asserting that, in protecting wetlands, "Con-
gress is not regulating wetlands use; it is regulating the economic, and often commercial,
activity of land use and development").
162 See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARv. ENV'rL. L. REV. 1,
38 (2003) (noting the implication in SWANCC that the Court might sometimes focus on
the beneficiaries rather than on the targets of regulation, and further noting that, in the
environmental area, such a focus on beneficiaries might have the effect of restricting con-
gressional authority); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90
GEo. L.J. 2143, 2163 (2002) (suggesting that the Court may be focusing its Commerce
Clause analysis on the purpose of the regulation rather than on the nature of the regulated
activity).
163 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173.
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E. The Renewed Interest in Purpose Analysis
Recent Commerce Clause cases also demonstrate a renewed in-
terest in legislative purpose. 164 The Lopez majority included scrutiny
of legislative purpose in its Commerce Clause assessment. In rejecting
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court had to confront the broad
construction of the Commerce Clause in Wickard v. Filburn.165 The
Court attempted to distinguish Wickard in part by reference to con-
gressional purpose, quoting language from Wickard stating that influ-
encing the wheat market served as "'[o] ne of the primary purposes'"
of the challenged enactment.' 66 The Lopez Court thus attempted to
read a commercial-purpose requirement back into post-193 7 Com-
merce Clause doctrine.
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy also emphasized the rele-
vance of commercial purpose. He insisted that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act differed from prior legislation upheld by the Court in that
"neither the purposes nor the design of the statute has an evident
commercial nexus." 167 The Court in Morrison quoted this language
from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in support of its contention that
the Violence Against Women Act was not a valid exercise of Con-
gress's Commerce Clause authority. 168 In SWANCC, a concern about
the noneconomic purpose of wetlands regulation may have driven the
Court's skepticism about the constitutionality of the challenged regu-
latory regime.' 69 Although the Court has not returned to the perspec-
tive of cases such as Hammer v. Dagenhart, in which improper motive
sufficed to doom legislation, 70 the Court's recent references to legis-
lative purpose emphasize the potential breadth of the Court's
unidimensional approach. If the Court can pick one perspective,
such as legislative purpose, to invalidate legislation, the Court wields
great power indeed.
164 For a discussion of the Court's apparent resort to legislative purpose analysis as a
means of limiting congressional authority, see Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 1, at 136-39.
165 See 317 U.S. 111, 123-25 (1942); see also supra note 88 and accompanying text
(identifying the centrality of the nature of the benefit conferred in Wickards Commerce
Clause analysis).
166 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at
128).
167 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see also id. at 643-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the
majority's renewed scrutiny of legislative purpose).
169 See Gerhardt, supra note 162, at 2163 ("In Solid Waste Agency and Morrison, the Court
seems to suggest that what matters for purposes of aggregation in Commerce Clause cases
is whether the basic purpose of the law is economic, not whether some economic activity is
the means to achieve a noneconomic objective, such as clean water or air.").
170 See 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
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F. The Perspective Debate in the Lower Courts
The constitutionality of a variety of statutes will turn on whether
courts generally adopt a unidimensional approach. In particular,
many statutes will stand or fall depending on whether courts consider
the commercial nature of the benefits produced by legislation. Re-
cent lower court rulings have highlighted this issue.
In Gibbs v. Babbitt, for example, the Fourth Circuit upheld an ap-
plication of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) by focusing on
regulatory benefits.171 Gibbs concerned the constitutionality of regula-
tions protecting the red wolf issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service, as
authorized by the ESA.172 The court validated the regulations based
on the connection between the killing of the red wolf and interstate
commerce. 173 In support of this conclusion, the court focused
broadly on the benefits of the regulation. The court began by noting
that farmers and ranchers kill red wolves primarily for economic rea-
sons-to protect crops and livestock. 174 The court then emphasized
that the protection of red wolves can result in significant commercial
benefits by promoting tourism, scientific research, and the possibility
of renewed trade in fur pelts. 175 The court summarized its conclusion
by stating that "the protection of the red wolf ... substantially affects
interstate commerce."176
As this quotation illustrates, the Gibbs court focused on the com-
mercial benefits of the regulation. The court held that such benefits
constituted a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to validate con-
gressional regulation. 177 If the court had focused solely on the target
of the regulation-the killing of red wolves, or perhaps the hunter-
the argument that the regulation was a valid exercise of Commerce
Clause power might have been more difficult to accept. One could
argue that the regulated activity in this case was the killing of wolves,
rather than tourism, scientific research, or pelt production. As Judge
Luttig's dissent noted, it is not clear that the killing of red wolves can
be characterized as an economic activity.1 78
The protection of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly provoked a
similarjudicial debate about the significance of the targets and benefi-
171 214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000).
172 See id. at 487-88.
173 See id. at 490-99.
174 Id. at 492.
175 See id. at 492-95.
176 Id. at 497.
177 See id.
178 See id. at 507 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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ciaries of Commerce Clause regulation. 179 In National Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Babbitt, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the ESA could
constitutionally be applied to the Fly, an endangered species located
only in California.'" 0 The judges hearing the case each filed a sepa-
rate opinion; two concurring judges concluded, based on different
analyses, that the ESA was constitutional as applied. Judge Wald, one
of the two judges voting to uphold the law, argued that the commer-
cial effects of the regulation validated the exercise of federal com-
merce power.' 8 ' She emphasized that safeguarding the Fly prevented
the erosion of biodiversity and thus protected future interstate com-
merce.1 82 Judge Henderson, who also voted to uphold the regulation,
similarly relied on the commercial impact of the regulation. 18 3 Agree-
ing in part with Judge Wald's opinion, Judge Henderson stressed that
the reduction in biodiversity could harm interstate commerce.' 84
Judge Henderson further looked at the regulatory targets, noting that,
in this case, the regulation affected specific commercial develop-
ments, namely, the construction of a hospital and the redesign of a
traffic intersection. 85 Writing in dissent, Judge Sentelle questioned
the appropriateness of reliance on the benefits of the regulation to
justify the exercise of congressional power. 186 Judge Sentelle's reason-
ing focused on the general category of the regulation at issue-land
use policies.18 7 He rejected the arguments of Judge Wald and Judge
Henderson because, in his view, it is the activity directly regulated that
must have a connection to interstate commerce.' 88 The constitutional
issue in National Ass'n of Home Builders thus depended on which and
how many perspectives could be employed in scrutinizing the
legislation.
The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE)
provides another example of the significance of the dimensionality
debate and further reveals how the courts' adoption of a unidimen-
sional or multidimensional perspective makes a constitutional differ-
179 John Copeland Nagle's insightful analysis of this debate highlights the importance
in Commerce Clause analysis of the choice of the "activity" to be examined for substantial
effects on interstate commerce. See Nagle, supra note 9, at 209.
180 See 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
t81 See id. at 1052-57. Judge Wald also determined that the law was a valid regulation
of the channels of interstate commerce. See id. at 1046-49.
182 See id. at 1052-54.
183 See id. at 1057-60 (Henderson, J., concurring).
184 See id. at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring).
185 Id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring).
186 See id. at 1064-67 (SentelleJ., dissenting).
187 See id. at 1064 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("The activity regulated in the present case
involves local land use, a ... traditional stronghold of state authority.").
188 See id. at 1067 (Sentelle, J. dissenting) ("Nowhere is it suggested that Congress can
regulate activities not having a substantial effect on commerce because the regulation itself
can be crafted in such a fashion as to have such an effect.").
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ence. In United States v. Gregg, the Third Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of FACE as applied to defendants obstructing access
to a reproductive health clinic.' 8 9 In an opinion by Judge Oakes, the
court acknowledged that the economic nature of the activity at issue
played a central role in the Commerce Clause analysis. 91° The court
argued that economic activity can be understood in "broad terms." 19 1
In that regard, the court asserted that the protest activity prohibited
by FACE obstructed economic activity-provision of reproductive
health services-and thus had economic effects. 192 The court con-
cluded that the Constitution gives Congress the authority to enact
FACE as a means of facilitating interstate commerce. 193 Dissenting,
Judge Weis insisted that it is the character of the conduct directly reg-
ulated that is determinative in Commerce Clause analysis. 194 With re-
gard to FACE, he contended that the regulated activity, consisting of
certain kinds of protest and obstruction, was noncommercial.' 95
Judge Weis concluded that, because the regulated conduct was non-
commercial, the statute could not be a valid exercise of congressional
Commerce Clause authority. 96 The commercial effects of the regu-
lated protest activity did not render the activity itself commercial.' 97
Thus, the dispute between the majority and the dissent in Gregg
turned on whether the commercial benefits of the regulation brought
it within congressional power.
G. The Rise and Decline of Multidimensional Review
This Part has discussed the development of the Court's Com-
merce Clause analysis over the course of the twentieth century. The
overall tale is familiar, by now almost classic. Before 1937, the Court
often strictly scrutinized congressional exercises of the commerce
power.1' 8 After 1937, the Court adopted a more deferential posture
and found no enactment to exceed congressional power. 199 Begin-
ning with the Lopez decision in 1995, however, the Court resumed a
189 See 226 F.3d 253, 265-67 (3d Cir. 2000).
190 Id. at 262.
191 See id.
192 [d. ("[T]he misconduct regulated by FACE, although not motivated by commercial
concerns, has an effect which is, at its essence, economic.").
193 See id. at 267.
194 See id. at 269-71 (Weis, J., dissenting).
195 See id. at 269-70 (Weis, J., dissenting) ("[A] protester's conduct... cannot in any
sense be deemed economic or commercial in character.").
196 See id. at 273-74 (Weis, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 269-71 (Weis, J., dissenting).
198 See supra Part ll.B.
199 See supra Part I.C.
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more rigorous review of congressional action under the Commerce
Clause.2 00
This Part has placed that story in a particular framework, empha-
sizing the different dimensions of Supreme Court review. Specifically,
this Part has explored how the Court's willingness to consider multi-
ple perspectives after 1937 was central to the transformation of its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 20 1 Rather than focus exclusively on
the nature of the conduct directly regulated, the Court began to un-
derstand the Constitution as allowing Congress to reach activity based
on its commercial effects. By broadening its view of the statutory
scheme to consider the commercial benefits of legislation, the Court
empowered Congress to reach a wider range of conduct. The evolu-
tion of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence thus reflects the Court's
changing views on the perspectives from which to consider the nexus
to commerce.
The post-1937 expansion in perspective was not entirely novel.
The Court previously had adopted a broad, multidimensional ap-
proach in interpreting the Commerce Clause, but only in particular
areas.202 The pre-New Deal Court understood Commerce Clause
cases as fitting into distinct categories, and it applied different rules to
the various categories.20 3 The Court approved of the exercise of con-
gressional power to protect commerce, but only in certain domains,
such as regulating instrumentalities of interstate commerce and regu-
lating activities obstructing the current of commerce. 20 4 This categor-
ical approach limited the reach of congressional power. The
categories allowed the Court to focus on the beneficiaries of commer-
cial regulation in certain areas, and to ignore them in others. The
categorical framework enabled the Court to fashion doctrines that re-
sponded to selected historical developments, while limiting the explo-
sive potential of the doctrines.
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court began to disas-
semble the categorical framework for addressing Commerce Clause
questions. 20 5 The lines began to seem artificial, and the Court began
to understand the stream of commerce cases as exemplary, rather
than exceptional. In characteristically revolutionary fashion, anomaly
became paradigm. The Court accepted the general principle that
Commerce Clause legislation may be valid based on the regulated ac-
200 See supra Part II.D.
201 See supra Part II.C.
202 See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
204 See supra Part II.B.
205 See CUSHMAN, supra note 70, at 169-70 (discussing the "deformalization" of the
Court's categorical distinctions); see also supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Jones & Laughlin).
2003] 1233
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tivity's effects on commerce. 20 6 With the decline of the categorical
approach, multidimensionality extended to all areas of the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Broad validation of congressional
enactments from 1937 to 1995 flowed from this expansion of permissi-
ble perspectives. 20 7 The Court's recent Commerce Clause cases, how-
ever, have suggested a return to unidimensionality. 20 The Court
seems poised once again to focus on a single perspective, generally
that of the target of the legislation. This singular focus threatens the
validity of a variety of federal statutes.
III
THE REGULATORY PRISM AND THE QUEST FOR INTERPRETIVE
SING;uITurY: THE INSIGHTS OF THE PURPOSE
ANAL-.Ysis CRITIQUE
The Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence shows a shift from a
narrow understanding of congressional power prior to 1937 to a more
robust view in the period from 1937 to 1995. During this sixty year
span, numerous types of commerce-related links sufficed to justify fed-
eral regulation. Most significantly, the transformative pre-1995 cases
sometimes focused on the harms to be remedied by congressional ac-
tion (the legislative impetus in our regulatory prism conception), the
nature of the regulatory targets or the targets' activities, the benefits
to beneficiary classes, or broader beneficial effects on commerce, even
if the legislatively targeted activity was not itself commerce. Since Lo-
pez, however, the Court has narrowed its focus. In its three most sig-
nificant and recent Commerce Clause cases, the Court has looked for
a single, relevant commercial target without conceding the arrogation
of congressional power inherent in this selection process. 20 9 The
coupling of a search for a single, particular relevant activity with the
new requirement that the Court-defined relevant activity itself be com-
mercial or economic2 (l has made the Court's selection of a single rele-
vant perspective the crucial and often fatal interpretive move.
This Part illuminates the Court's approach by reference to other
quests for interpretive singularity. To highlight the flaws of the
Court's new Commerce Clause methodology, this Part builds on well-
developed criticism of such interpretive reductionism in the context
of statutory construction. It shows how the Court's recent Commerce
Clause cases necessarily involve an analytical reduction of the com-
206 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
207 See supra Part I1.C.
208 See supra Part II.D.
209 See supra Part lI.D.
210 For a discussion of whether the Court uses the terms "economic" and "commercial"
interchangeably, see supra note 5.
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plexities of legislation in a manner resembling these much-criticized
modes of statutory interpretation. In particular, the Court's
unidimensional Commerce Clause approach shares attributes and
logic flaws with other reductionist approaches to statutory interpreta-
tion that focus upon only one legislative purpose to the neglect of
other, less obvious legislative purposes or compromises.211
Whether examined in the context of a constitutional challenge
under the Commerce Clause or of a debate over statutory meaning,
laws tend to have purposes, not a purpose, and to reflect com-
promises. Interpretive attempts to reduce a law to a single purpose, or
to assert that a law relates only to a particular activity or must be
viewed through a single perspective, are problematic. As the concept
of the regulatory prism suggests, not only could one focus on the tar-
get, the beneficiary, the motivation, or the effects of legislation, but
virtually every statute implicates multiple targets, beneficiaries, motiva-
tions, and effects.212 Much as modes of statutory interpretation that
privilege only one legislative purpose empower courts to make
politicized or arbitrary choices, a Commerce Clause analysis that rec-
ognizes only one relevant activity or perspective turns a previously def-
erential framework allowing laws to pass muster in numerous ways
into a simplistic and undeferential framework rendering far easier ju-
dicial declarations of unconstitutionality.
This Part suggests that a review of the burgeoning literature on
statutory interpretation, especially debates over how courts should as-
sess and consider statutory purposes, reveals the problematic nature
of the Court's new reductionist, unidimensional Commerce Clause
methodology. As recent investigations of the legislative and judicial
process highlight, the fundamental problem lies not in the Court's
picking the "wrong" perspective, but in the Court's apparent belief
that it can find a principled basis for isolating any single perspective as
dispositive. In this regard, two methodological clarifications are in or-
der. First, although the Article finds much to credit in the criticisms
of purposive statutory interpretation explored in this Part (many ar-
ticulated by proponents of textualist interpretive modes), this Article's
argument does not hinge on taking sides here on our preferred ap-
proach to statutory construction. It relies instead on largely unan-
swered critiques of the search for a single legislative purpose. 213
Second, this Article does not assert that the Court has treated a uni-
211 See infra Part III.A.1.
212 See supra Part I.
213 Whether, despite these serious flaws, purposive methods of statutory interpretation
prove superior to their competitors presents a separate question beyond the scope of this
Article. The ultimate choice of an interpretive method involves complex, often context-
specific assessments, including calculation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of com-
peting theories in a world in which every method is imperfect.
2003] 1235
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tary legislative purpose as determinative in Commerce Clause cases.214
Rather, it argues that the Court has extracted from each statute a sin-
gle "activity" to feed into its Commerce Clause analysis. This process
of extraction, with its attendant distortion, displays the same flaws that
infect modes of statutory construction based on assignment of a single
legislative purpose.
To put this argument in context, consider the situation in
SWANCC and imagine a rule that prohibits development on wetlands
that serve as habitats for migratory birds. Is the law "really" about (a)
construction, (b) land use, (c) water, (d) birds, or (e) all of the above?
Recent Commerce Clause cases indicate that the Court thinks (e) is
not an acceptable response. The choice among the other answers is
not an easy one. The proper characterization of the provision inevita-
bly involves issues of statutory construction, and recent debates about
statutory interpretation emphasize the arbitrariness of any judicially
mandated selection of a single activity. Far from offering assistance to
the Court's unidimensional methodology, the literature on statutory
construction demonstrates the flaws of any such reductionist project.
A. The Legislative Purpose Critique and Commerce "Activities"
Judicial and scholarly critiques of "purposive" statutory interpre-
tation highlight the questionable analytical assumptions implicit in
the search for a single relevant activity in assessing federal Commerce
Clause power. 215 In particular, this Article suggests that, just as the
search for a single or overriding statutory purpose is ill-fated and sub-
ject to judicial abuse, the unidimensional Commerce Clause approach
necessarily ignores a far more complex legislative reality and therefore
is similarly vulnerable to judicial error and overreaching. If courts
214 The Court, however, has shown increased attention to questions of statutory pur-
pose in this area. See supra Part I1.E.
215 In an apparently paradoxical stance, which this Article reconciles later, see infra Part
IV, textualist proponents who criticize purposive modes of statutory interpretation have
embraced a Commerce Clause jurisprudence that adopts a unidimensional commercial
activity perspective. The five-Justice majority recasting Commerce Clause jurisprudence in-
cludes Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and O'Connor. See,
e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). TheseJustices, particularly justices Scalia and Thomas, have been among the most
ardent advocates of textualism and critics of recourse to legislative history. For articles
discussing the content and rationale of this new textualism, see, for example, William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
"Plain Meaning". Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. Po 'v 401 (1994). As this Article later suggests, these apparently inconsistent analyti-
cal techniques yield consistent results insofar as they give courts enhanced power to over-
ride political branch determinations. Both modes of analysis facilitate a judicial
antiregulatory agenda. See infra Part IV.
1236 [Vol. 88:1199
UNIDIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM
should be "faithful agents" 21 6 of the legislature and must be con-
strained from overstepping their powers-two central tenets of textu-
alism and the critique of purposivist interpretation-then the Court's
newly emergent unidimensional "activity" analysis should be
discarded.
1. Statutes' Multiple Purposes
The textualist critique of purposive statutory interpretation il-
luminates the conceptual and practical flaws in privileging a single
legislative purpose or relevant activity. References to analysis of statu-
tory purpose and "purposivist" interpretation have several distinct ele-
ments. The textualist critique of judicial "purpose" analysis is not
rooted in the idea that legislators and other politicians act without
goals or purposes. Virtually all scholars of the legislative process start
with the working assumption that political actors act in a purposive
manner, in the sense of trying to achieve particular goals. 217
Instead, the textualist discomfort with purposive interpretation is
rooted first in the primacy of the written statutory text. The heart of
this critique is that courts should act as faithful agents of the legisla-
ture by enforcing statutory law as written.2 18 Judicial constructions of
statutory law contrary to the written text, whether expanding its reach
to circumstances not specified in the law or perhaps carving out exclu-
sions for areas apparently covered, are viewed as anathema. As Judge
Easterbrook has argued, relying on "legislative history and an imputed
'spirit' to convert one approach into another dishonors the legislative
choice as effectively as expressly refusing to follow the law."' 219 As he
further stated in Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., " [c]ourts should
confine their attention to the purposes Congress sought to achieve by
216 On the concept of judges as faithful agents see, for example, John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-22 (2001).
217 The assumption that political actors engage in purposive activity is widely em-
braced. Advocates of enforcement of the particular "legislative bargain," such as Judge
Easterbrook, start from an assumption of purposive activity and call for interpretation of
laws to further the "contractual" bargain struck. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Do-
mains, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 544-49 (1983). Advocates ofjudicial construction of statutes
to further "public-regarding" legislative ends also assume purposive political activity, but
suggest that courts enforce only the public regarding bargain. See, e.g.,Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). Moreover, advocates of expansive readings of statutes to
further basic legislative purposes similarly start by assuming that political actors advocate
purposefully for their preferred ends. Even Kenneth Shepsle, who posits that the many
steps and actors in the legislative process produce legislation that is likely to be incoherent,
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They, "Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INrr'L
REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241-42, 242 n.6 (1992), starts from the assumption that legislative
actors will strive purposefully to further their goals, see id. at 241-45.
218 See supra note 216.
219 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994).
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the words it used. We interpret texts. The invocation of disembodied
purposes, reasons cut loose from language, is a sure way to frustrate
rather than implement these texts."220
The roots of this preference for text over broader research efforts
to glean statutory purpose are several fold. The first is rooted in legis-
lative supremacy and separation of powers conceptions. 22' Under this
view, the law that the legislature and president actually enact should
be the law followed by the courts.222 Outside the common law con-
text, courts should not create law and should resist the temptation to
recast the law in accordance with each judge's notions of sound pol-
icy. 2 2 3 In his essay on interpretation, justice Scalia criticizes importa-
tion into the statutory interpretation arena of the judicial common
law exercise that relies on judicial creativity in discerning and further-
ing public goals.22 4 After all, he observes, "[w] e live in an age of legis-
lation, and most new law is statutory law." 22 5 This first rationale thus
calls for judicial grappling with a statute's text in all of its complexity.
The second rationale for the textualist critique of purposive inter-
pretation-the inevitability of compromise in legislation-is of
greater salience to this Article's critique of recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Laws seldom have a unitary "purpose," and each law's
purposes may not be apparent from review only of the statutory
text.226 Legislative compromise is the norm, not the exception. Most
bills result from individual and interest group support, and once pro-
posed, quickly will attract the attention of affected constituencies.22 7
By threatening status quo arrangements, most proposed bills will en-
gender opposition and interest group activity, not just from the
targets of potential regulation, but also from others who might indi-
rectly suffer adverse effects. 228 Similarly, stakeholders advocating a
220 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.).
221 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ.
281, 291, 293 (1989) (analyzing implications of legislative supremacy for various interpre-
tive approaches).
222 See id. at 293 (acknowledging constitutional importance of courts "follow[ing] an
admittedly constitutional statute" but noting inevitability of open interpretive issues).
223 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF IN-
TERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 12-14 (1997).
224 See id.
225 Id. at 13.
226 See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 166 (1992) ("Apart from
the aims which are manifest in the language of the law itself, the legislators are likely to
have had a variety of ... further intentions, in enacting the law." (footnote omitted)).
227 See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 249-53 (1998) (discussing reasonsjudges should and his-
torically have considered "political context" in interpreting statutes).
228 Fred McChesney posits that politicians will propose laws that are unlikely to be
politically viable in order to attract interest group attention and campaign contributions.
See MCCHESNEY, supra note 24, passim.
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change in the law often will pick up additional support from others
who see ancillary benefits in the proposal. 229 Politicians attempting to
mediate conflicting public and private stakeholder views will assess a
complex array of variables to figure out whether to support, oppose,
or seek changes in proposed legislation. 230 Advocates of legislative
change will generally need to garner support from reluctant legislative
peers, typically by offering compromise language, additional text, am-
biguous language that avoids resolution of the dispute, or support for
a wholly unrelated bill.23' This last type of cross-statutory bargaining,
often referred to as logrolling, means that legislative compromises
may not be evident in particular textual limitations. 232
Writing for the majority in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Dimension Financial Corp.,23 3 Chief Justice Burger pointed to
the likelihood of compromise as one reason why courts and litigants
should avoid attribution of a single overriding purpose to a statute:
Application of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of spe-
cific provisions ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is
called upon to address and the dynamics of legislative action. Con-
gress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social
or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply
on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the
legislation may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation of the
"plain purpose" of legislation at the expense of the terms of the
statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and,
in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.
2 3 4
229 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 44-58,
88-90, 97-103 (1981) (discussing how diverse politicians and factions with disparate goals
combined to embrace Clean Air Act provisions that arguably were imprudent and
inefficient).
230 See id.; see also R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, TII LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL AcrION 88-118
(1990) (examining strategies legislators use to assemble winning political coalitions).
231 For a discussion of the role of statutory ambiguity in legislative action, see Joseph A.
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity
in Statutoiy Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 637-42 (2002).
232 For discussions of the theory of logrolling, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN &G ORDON TUL-
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
131-45 (5th prtg. 1974); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 82-86 (1989) (illustrating
how logrolling increases utility to the majority while externalizing the costs to minorities).
For an analysis of the operation of logrolling in Congress and of its significance for statu-
tory construction, see Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 434, 456-58 (1998) (noting arguments that legislative logrolling may protect minority
groups); Easterbrook, supra note 217, at 548 (arguing that logrolling poses great problems
for a court attempting to ascertain the legislature's overall design); David B. Spence, A
Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 397, 441 (2002) (positing that
Congress tries to stop itself from logrolling by passing statutes such as the Line Item Veto
Act).
233 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
234 Id. at 373-74.
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Thus, compromise is a pervasive feature of statutory law. Laws emerge
from a complex process in which interest group pressure, political
veto gates, party politics, multiple statute logrolling, and compromise
create laws that reflect competing considerations and negotiations
that may not be evident in the ultimate statutory text.2 35
A second, related criticism of purposive statutory interpretation is
that a statute's purpose can be difficult to determine because "legisla-
tion is frequently a congeries of different and sometimes conflicting
purposes. ' 236 In their critique of the Court's use of purposive analysis
in United Steelworkers v. Weber,237 William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and
Elizabeth Garrett assert that the Court "oversimplified the statute's
purpose and suppressed a possibly competing purpose .... Purposiv-
ism does not yield determinate answers when there is no neutral way
to arbitrate among different purposes."238 Furthermore, not all statu-
tory purposes will be evident in a statute's text or its assembled legisla-
tive history.2 39 Even expanding the interpretive inquiry to include
legislative history as well as text threatens to mislead because not all
purposes will be revealed in those materials. Judge Posner states that,
because "public materials" such as
the language of the statute, committee reports, and other conven-
tional aids to interpretation . . . invariably seek to disguise rather
than to flaunt the extent to which the real aim of the legislation is to
advance the selfish interests of one group in the society, the process
of statutory interpretation byjudges tends to give legislation a more
235 See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996) (reviewing the history and political
divisions surrounding the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act and showing that,
despite a unanimous legislative vote in favor of the enacted law, the bill reflected substan-
tial political divisions and compromise). For discussion of legislative "veto gates," see
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 7 (1994).
236 William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 335 (1990). For a classic critique of purposive interpretation, see
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 878 (1930) ("[T]o interpret a law
by its purposes requires the court to select one of a concatenated sequence of purposes,
and this choice is to be determined by motives which are usually suppressed.").
237 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
238 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 222
(2000).
239 In distilling the implications of public choice scholarship for statutory interpreta-
tion, Eskridge and Frickey state that
[t]o speak of a statute's "purpose" is incoherent, unless one means the deal
between rent-seeking groups and reelection-minded legislators....
... Some statutes are little else but backroom deals. Judicial attempts
to fancy up those deals with public-regarding rhetoric either are naive or
simply substitute the judge's conception of public policy for that of the leg-
islature. And when a court uses purposivist analysis to elaborate a statute, it
may actually undo a deliberate and precisely calibrated deal worked out in
the legislative process.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 236, at 334-35.
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public-spirited cast than the legislators actually intended. . . .The
judges easily may overlook compromises, and thus impart greater
thrust to a piece of legislation than the legislators agreed to.240
Compromise and multiplicity of purpose thus frequently limit the ex-
tent to which Congress actually agrees to further a particular legisla-
tive goal.
Despite these pervasive incentives for compromise, limiting lan-
guage, logrolling, and multiple legislative purposes, some advocates of
purposive interpretation argue that courts should resolve questions of
statutory interpretation by construing the law to further some asserted
primary purpose. John Manning and others refer to this form of pur-
posive interpretation as "strong purposivism." 24 1 The idea that courts
should further a statute's primary purpose was most widely accepted
in the early to mid-twentieth century, when faith in the honorable in-
tentions of politicians was perhaps at its height.2 42 Courts in that pe-
riod frequently accepted calls to read remedial legislation broadly or
to look past a problematic text, like that in Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States,243 by identifying a primary purpose to justify judicial dis-
regard of a statute's most ordinary meaning.24 4 Under this view,
courts would, in effect, look to a statute for its most discernible gen-
eral purpose and act in furtherance of that single overriding purpose.
Recent scholarship embracing "equity of the statute" approaches to
statutory interpretation has similarly embraced purposive interpreta-
tion, but relies on originalist arguments about judicial roles.2 45
This strong purposivism, especially the judicial search for a sin-
gle, overarching legislative purpose and interpretive expansion of this
single overriding purpose, has been much criticized. In a recent dis-
senting opinion, Justice Scalia captured the essence of this critique:
240 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 154 (1985).
241 See Manning, supra note 216, at 3 & n.3 ("I use 'strong purposivists' to identify those
who rely on purpose to depart from a clear statutory text, rather than those who use it
merely to clarify an ambiguous text.").
242 For a seminal discussion of the processes of purposive statutory interpretation, see
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAK-
ING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1377-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (exploring means to discern the "general purpose" of a statute and suggesting ratio-
nale for such an interpretive goal).
243 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892) (interpreting a federal statute appearing to prohibit
alien labor of any kind as inapplicable to the church's hiring of an English cleric, explain-
ing that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers"). For a critique of Holy
Dinity, see Manning, supra note 216, at 14-16.
244 Justice Scalia finds this practice, especially as it occurred in Holy Trinity, to be in-
defensible. See Scalia, supra note 223, at 18-23. Justice Scalia pithily asserts that "the deci-
sion was wrong because it failed to follow the text." Id. at 22.
245 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 216, at 22-27, 81-85. Manning's article responds in
part to arguments advanced in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998) (reviewing SCALIA, supra note 223).
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"Deduction from the 'broad purpose' of a statute begs the question if
it is used to decide by what means (and hence to what length) Congress
pursued that purpose."246 John Manning articulates the concept that
laws have limited scope in arguing that "legislation cannot be ex-
pected to pursue its purposes to their logical ends; accordingly, de-
parting from a precise statutory text may do no more than disturb a
carefully wrought legislative compromise. '2 47 Both Justice Scalia and
Professor Manning argue in terms resembling those used by Judge
Easterbrook in suggesting that statutes' limited "domains" should be
respected by the courts.248
It is difficult to glean a single paramount purpose in any law. To
reduce a complex piece of legislation to a single purpose flattens the
law's nuances, compromises, and other purposes. It must be empha-
sized, however, that this Article rejects the normative claim that textu-
alists assert as following, in part, from this critique of purposive
interpretation. Textualists frequently leap to the "therefore" conclu-
sion that text and only text should be consulted in statutory interpre-
tation battles.249 As this section discusses below, this Article embraces
criticisms of purposive analysis. What is problematic, however, is any
attempt by courts to arrogate to themselves sole interpretive power
without recognizing the implications of the complexity of the legisla-
tive process and resulting legislation. In nonconstitutional statutory
interpretation battles, recourse to materials beyond the text, with spe-
cial attention to a statute's vertical history, remains appropriate. In
any interpretive setting, a judicial interpretative method that seeks to
distill each law to being about a single activity is problematic. The
textualist jump to statutory analysis based only on review of statutory
text can itself empower courts to exercise interpretive creativity by lim-
iting the array of data that is considered. 250
This Article, in contrast, makes the normative claim that the inev-
itable complexity of statutory law calls for courts to adopt deferential
interpretive modes that acknowledge legislative complexity, multiple
purposes, compromises, and blurred distinctions between targets and
beneficiaries. Largely in response to the Supreme Court's clear call
for a Commerce Clause test that retains a meaningful judicial check-
246 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 726
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247 Manning, supra note 216, at 18.
248 See Easterbrook, supra note 217, passim.
249 See Strauss, supra note 227, at 243 (reviewing textualists' focus on text and arguing
for attention to political history); see also Manning, supra note 216, at 15-22 (explaining
textualists' rejection of recourse to nontextual materials to aid interpretation).
250 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351, 372-73 (1994) (explaining that textualists must become "more imaginative" with
"fewer tools at [their] disposal").
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ing role, this Article ultimately suggests a "legislativist approach" to
Commerce Clause analysis that focuses on numerous textual ele-
ments. 2 5' The goal, however, is to ensure that courts interpret laws so
as to acknowledge their complexities, compromises, and enactment
dynamics. The peril in both statutory interpretation and Commerce
Clause adjudication contexts lies in reducing a law to a single goal,
purpose or dimension, not in going past the textual veneer of statu-
tory language.
Nevertheless, legislative process insights, many derived from tex-
tualism, remain valuable in how they shed light on the problems in-
herent in the Court's recent recasting of Commerce Clause analysis.
The Court's focus on a law as dealing with only a single relevant activ-
ity, and its insistence that the only relevant question is whether the
target's regulated conduct is itself commercial, reflects an inappropri-
ately flattened view of legislation that suffers from the same errors in-
herent in the search for a single legislative purpose. Both approaches
are reductionist in their methodology, parsing legislative texts and
drawing from that analysis conclusions about a single allegedly rele-
vant activity (in the commerce arena) or a single relevant purpose (in
debates over statutory meaning). Laws have purposes, not a purpose,
and tend to be motivated by and have as their goals multiple activities
and related effects. The Court's unidimensional Commerce Clause
approach is difficult to square with the realities of legislation, which
are well described in critiques of purposive statutory interpretation.
2. The Blurred Line Between Legislative Targets and Beneficiaries
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court appeared to develop a "target"
oriented perspective on the Commerce Clause analysis of challenged
laws. 25 2 As the above critique of purposive modes of statutory inter-
pretation suggests, limiting judicial analysis to the search for a prime
target or beneficiary of regulation is also inappropriate. In a world of
compromise and logrolling, a target of regulation-in the sense of the
newly constrained entity-may also be the beneficiary of regulatory
approaches selected. For example, regulation may prohibit or con-
strain some target behavior, but may also create barriers to entry of
new competitors, adopt standards favorable to targets as compared
with other proposed standards, or create more predictable market
and political conditions.
The acknowledgment of a blurred line between targets and bene-
ficiaries is substantially rooted in early law and economics literature.
251 See infra Part V.
252 See supra notes 110-32 and accompanying text. The SWANCC decision, on the
other hand, seemed to focus more on the beneficiaries of regulation-wetlands and migra-
tory birds. See supra notes 147-63 and accompanying text.
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The ostensible targets of a regulation are in most cases at least partial
beneficiaries as well, even in the rare case of a statute that has a clear
primary purpose. Moreover, apparent beneficiaries of regulation may
actually be partial losers. Economist George Stigler suggested in 1971
that "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed
and operated primarily for its benefit."2 53 He acknowledged that
some regulation may be onerous for a target industry (point Tin our
regulatory prism conception), but suggested that even such onerous
regulations will tend to create benefits such as subsidies, control over
entry by rivals, or profit-enhancing price stability.254 Thus, the ostensi-
ble targets of regulation often are also partial beneficiaries, facing reg-
ulatory constraints, but also typically emerging with benefits that may
be among the legislature's chief goals.
The soundness of Stigler's insight that beneficiaries and targets
will be difficult to distinguish is easily seen in several areas of legisla-
tion thought to operate at the fringe of federal commerce power. In
abortion clinic access legislation, for example, the apparent benefi-
ciaries may be viewed as the clinics, doctors, or patients seeking ac-
cess. In actuality, however, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act (FACE) also provides protection for the right of opponents of
abortion to engage in protest, by making clear that the law prohibits
only efforts to prevent clinic access. 255 Indeed, the statute states ex-
plicitly that it does not reach expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment. 256 Moreover, colloquy on the floor of the Senate made
clear that the bill was intended to provide broad safeguards for nonvi-
253 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 3,
3 (1971), reprinted in GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 114 (1975). Stigler's
theory of economic regulation has been challenged on a number of grounds. See Roger G.
Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION 1254-87 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (positing that Stig-
ler's theory of monopoly capture by regulated interests occurs only in extreme cases and
that Stigler's theory overemphasizes the ability of politicians to control agencies); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 47-73
(1990) (arguing that regulation occurs for a variety of reasons beyond Stigler's theory of
interest group transfer); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 372-73 (1983) (asserting that regulators have larger
constituencies extending beyond the scope of directly regulated interests); John J. Binder,
Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data, 16 RAND J. ECON. 167, at 181-82
(1985) (empirically challenging regulatory acquisition theory in finding no systematic in-
creased industry wealth flowing from regulatory changes, but also noting the difficulty of
discerning when regulatory change events will be noted in the market); Steven P. Croley,
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, passim
(1998) (arguing that Stigler's public choice theory of regulation puts excessive weight on
legislators' electoral goals and that it is inconsistent in its treatment of principal-agent and
collective action problems between regulators, the regulated, legislators and voters).
254 See Stigler, supra note 253, at 4-6.
255 See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (2000).
256 See id. § 248(d)(1); 140 CONG. REC. H3126 (daily ed. May 5, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Schumer) (noting that the bill was drafted more narrowly than the injunction re-
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olent protest. 25 7 Patients confronted by yelling protestors are unlikely
to consider themselves beneficiaries of a law providing protestors such
rights, while protestors are similarly likely to consider themselves
losers under the law. In addition, the statute also applies to violent
protests at facilities that counsel women not to have abortions.258
FACE's statutory scheme thus creates groups that are simultaneously
targets and beneficiaries. 259 The law creates a version of ritualized
political protest rendering difficult the identification of targets and
beneficiaries. 260 Medical care providers and local police are perhaps
also regulatory beneficiaries of a more stable political and market en-
vironment. They too, however, are probably only partial victors in the
political process. These types of entities might be more akin to the
fanning spectrum of color effects emanating from the "regulatory
prism" suggested in Part I. The many compromises evident in this law
reflect politicians carefully tiptoeing around a politically charged
issue.
Laws protecting wetlands and endangered species similarly create
a variety of targets and beneficiaries that, if analyzed from only a sin-
gle perspective, might or might not justify federal regulation. Wet-
lands protection, for example, could be seen as targeting or serving
primarily the goal of protecting vulnerable wetlands and related eco-
systems, but it might also be understood to target entities that
threaten to destroy wetlands or their biological integrity.261 True to
viewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753
(1994)).
257 See 139 CONG. REC. S15672 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statements of Sen. Mikulski
and Sen. Feinstein) (clarifying that the bill "is so narrowly drawn and therefore would
allow both first amendment, literally first amendment rights, but also the figurative first
amendment rights which is the nonviolent protest").
258 See 18 U.S.C. § 248(e) (5) (defining reproductive health services to include "coun-
seling or referral services relating to the human reproductive system"); H.R. REP. No. 103-
488, at 13 (1994) ("[F]acilities that do not offer abortions or other reproductive health
care, but offer only counseling about alternatives to abortion, are included [in the scope of
the proposed Act].").
259 See 139 CONG. REC. H10087 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1993) (statement of Rep. Collins)
("[The bill] has a double thrust: It protects peaceful demonstration and the right to
choose your doctor without fear of violence."); 139 CONG. REC. S15681 (daily ed. Nov. 16,
1993) (statement of Sen. Gorton) ("This bill achieves a balance between two diametrically
opposed points of view.").
260 See 139 CONG. REC. S15677 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Wofford)
("[T] his legislation should serve as a rule of reason to persuade people on all sides of this
deep controversy not to move beyond peaceful protest and truly civil disobedience, over
the threshold into physical obstruction, intimidation and violence."); 139 CONG. REc.
S15686 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) ("In its earlier versions,
the case could be made that this bill took sides in that controversy, but the bill ... today
does not. I view this bill as an attempt by the Congress and the Nation to endorse an old-
fashioned notion ... of civility in our national debates.").
261 The Clean Water Act's statutory declaration of goals and policy focuses both on the
benefits of the legislation, such as "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical,
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Stigler's observation, other provisions give some potential regulatory
targets a near complete break from regulation.2 62 Similarly, the stated
purpose of endangered species law is the protection of endangered
species, but the law incorporates broad statutory exclusions. 263 In
both bodies of law, one can identify other more distinct but still pre-
dictable beneficiaries, such as hunters and fishers, the tourist trade,
and ecologists and biologists. If one focuses only upon the immediate
regulatory beneficiary-that is, the thing or activity directly protected,
for example a wetlands or endangered species-a Commerce Clause
justification would require several leaps of logic to establish both com-
mercial and interstate repercussions. Considered from a different
perspective, however, people interested in hunting, hiking, research,
and eco-tourism clearly provide a basis for finding substantial links to
interstate commerce.
A focus on the target of these laws-in the sense of the likely
agent of harm-easily satisfies Commerce Clause scrutiny. Real estate
and land development may historically be subject to local regulation,
but in an era of bank consolidations, bundled derivative marketing
interests in developments, national and international insurers, and
with tax incentives often encouraging particular forms of develop-
ment, these are commercial enterprises imbued with many interstate
commercial links.264 Unless the Court is en route to reviving subject
matter limitations on the federal government, as others have sug-
gested,26 5 the mere fact that states have historically regulated land de-
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000), and providing
for "the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife," id. § 1251 (a) (2), and
on the agents of harm to national waters, id. § 1251 (a) (3) ("[lt is the national policy that
the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts be prohibited."). One of the statute's
key enforcement provisions focuses on regulating particular activities, namely, the "dis-
charge of dredged or fill materials into . . .navigable waters," see id. § 1344(a), but also
links regulatory power to particular environmental beneficiaries. The statute authorizes
regulation prohibiting disposal of such materials in cases in which it would have an "unac-
ceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (in-
cluding spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas." See id. § 1344(c).
262 See id. § 1344(f) (excluding, inter alia, farming and other agricultural operations
from regulatory control tinder § 1344).
263 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000) (establishing a regulatory consultation process to
authorize potentially harmful activity under an "incidental taking" provision); see also infra
notes 267-70 (discussing other ESA safety valves).
264 See Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium: "Yes" to Broad
Congressional Control over Commercial Transactions; "No" to Federal Legislation on Social and Cul-
tural Issues, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213, 1228-31 (2003) (discussing ways that the real estate busi-
ness is imbued with commerce).
265 Some commentators have suggested that the Court's recent federalism cases herald
a return to the notion that some areas of traditional state functions lie beyond federal
legislative power. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 9, at 205-06. Ten years before Lopez, the
Court repudiated the doctrine that Congress's Commerce Clause authority does not ex-
tend to the regulation of traditional state functions. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985), overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
1246 [Vol. 88:1199
2003] UN1DIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM 1247
velopment should not be viewed as disabling federal legislative action
in situations where commercial activity, harms, or effects justify exer-
cise of the commerce power.266
Even the ostensible targets of these laws, such as real estate devel-
opers likely to cause harms proscribed by the statutes, are also partial
beneficiaries. Wetlands are not absolutely protected, but subject to
smaller scale intrusions permitted by statutorily authorized general
permits and also allowed if a development can be shown to be water
dependent and without viable alternatives. 267 Similarly, endangered
species harms are authorized if caused pursuant to an "incidental take
permit,"2 68 an approved habitat conservation plan,"69 or an exemp-
tion granted by the Endangered Species Committee under statutory
approval criteria.270 ESA provisions require "critical habitat" designa-
tions that are supposed to accompany listing of endangered species to
take into account the benefits and costs, including the economic im-
pact, of such designations.271 Procedural hurdles and constraints fur-
ther limit the ability of the government and environmentalist groups
to block "target" activities regulated under the statutes. 272
U.S. 833 (1976). Nonetheless, respect for state functions soon returned in the guise of a
clear statement rule. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991); Ann Althouse,
Enf rcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 793, 809 (1996) (charac-
terizing Gregory as a "reviv[al]" of "Uj]udicial solicitude for traditional state functions");
William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 623-25 (1992) (asserting that Gregory
"seems to have revived National League of Cities, at least as a new super-strong rule of statu-
tory interpretation").
266 As discussed below, the Court in SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001), explicitly
indicated that the tradition of state authority over land and water use informed in part its
conclusion that the Army Corps of Engineers had exceeded its statutory grant of authority.
See infra note 277. Justice Stevens, in contrast, asserted that the statutory provisions at issue
were yet another example of federal pollution-control leadership. See id. at 191 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting).
267 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1343(c), 1344(b), (e).
268 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)-(4) (providing authorization tinder certain circum-
stances for regulatory approval of agency action involving only "incidental taking" of a
protected species).
269 See id. § 1539(a) (authorizing approval of incidental takings of endangered species
if the permit applicant has created a conservation plan to minimize harm to endangered
species); see also id. § 1539(b) (providing for "hardship" exemptions to the permitting re-
quirements of § 1539(a)).
270 See id. § 1536(e)-(h); see also, e.g., id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(ii) (authorizing exemptions
in cases in which the Endangered Species Committee finds that an applicant meets the
statutory conditions, including a showing that "the benefits of such action clearly outweigh
the benefits of alternative courses of action").
271 See id. § 1533(b) (2) (stating that critical habitat designations shall "tak[e] into con-
sideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particu-
lar area as critical habitat" and authorizing exclusion of areas if the "benefits of . ..
exclusion outweigh the benefits" of designation, unless exclusion will "result in extinction
of the species concerned").
272 In particular, the regulatory listing process for endangered species under the ESA,
see id. § 1533(a) (1)-(2), has produced substantial delay and litigation because of the high
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A particularly notable example of laws that both target harm and
create benefits for the ostensible target can be seen in the context of
tobacco regulation. As the Supreme Court discussed in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., since 1938, Congress has repeatedly regu-
lated aspects of tobacco production, use, and sales. 273 As construed by
the Court, Congress's piecemeal legislative regulation of tobacco also
collectively denied the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the au-
thority to regulate cigarettes and other tobacco products. 274
These examples of statutory safety valves and limited protections
reveal that, even beyond the scope of industry specific laws contem-
plated by Stigler, regulatory frameworks provide a mix of partial win-
ners and losers that often evade clear identification. Similarly, judicial
characterization of a law as having a particular purpose or subject-
matter domain (such as the SWANCC Court's assertion that wetlands
protection implicated land use regulation, not environmental protec-
tion 2 75) is indeterminate and manipulable. Laws can frequently be
characterized as serving multiple purposes or bridging several subject-
matter domains. The Court often refuses to distill laws to a single
purpose. 27 6 In the federalism area, however, the Court, since Lopez,
appears inclined to reduce each law's complexity and identify a single
relevant activity or subject area, rather than acknowledge other sub-
ject areas implicated by the law. 277
The Court's recent unidimensional inquiry, which attempts to
identify a single, relevant Commerce Clause "activity," ignores the in-
herent complexities of statutory law and the legislative process. All
four areas of law discussed in this Article-abortion clinic access, wet-
stakes of listing and the opportunities for stakeholders to create delay. See Amy Whrite-
nour Ando, Waiting to Be Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of
Regulatoty Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29, passim (1999); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endan-
gered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings and Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 313, 317-21
(1997).
273 529 U.S. 120, 143-159 (2000).
274 See id. at 159-161. For a critique of the Court's approach to statutory interpreta-
tion in Brown & Williamson, see Buzbee, One-Congress Fiction, supra note 1, at 194-200.
275 See 531 U.S. 159, 166-67 (2001).
276 See supra Part IlI.A.1.
277 SWANCC is particularly notable for its disputed finding that wetlands protection is a
form of land use regulation, an area traditionally regulated by the states. See 531 U.S. at
166-67, 173-74. Despite the Court's strong language, there are equally compelling, alter-
nate characterizations of the law at issue in SWANCC. For instance, Justice Stevens's dissent
noted that wetlands protection, viewed in its historical context, is part of the larger trend of
innovations in federal environmental law that commenced in the late 1960s. See id. at
174-81 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Moreover, wetlands protection is linked to migratory bird
protections under international treaties, other federal laws, traditional federal regulation
of navigation, and constraints on degradation of rivers and ocean waters. See FRANK P.
GRAD &JOEL A. MiNTz, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 382-95 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the mod-
ern Clean Water Act as derived in part from federal statutory law, such as the federal Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401).
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lands and endangered species protection, and tobacco regulation-
present serious challenges to any analysis that attempts to discern
targets and beneficiaries, let alone identify motivation behind these
laws. Compromises reflected in these laws and their direct and indi-
rect effects render difficult any such exercise. Furthermore, the more
a law relies upon new techniques to regulate a harm or create a pro-
tection, the less it even fits into judicially defined categories of regula-
tion. Identifying the relevant actors in the regulatory prism tends to
be easy, but determining their status as targets and beneficiaries is
more challenging. Similarly, no principled basis guides a court seek-
ing to discern a particular "activity," harm, or effect that should be
the focus of Commerce Clause analysis. One may appropriately iden-
tify relevant purposes, effects, and activities, but seldom a unitary legis-
lative end.
Singling out a particular activity requires a commitment to a cer-
tain baseline. Only against such a fixed (albeit usually unacknowl-
edged) background can the Court identify a single activity as the
rupture in the natural order that demands close constitutional scru-
tiny. As discussed earlier in this Article, the Court appears to rely on
common law benchmarks to characterize the relevant activity. 278 In
SWANCC, for example, the Court characterized the challenged provi-
sion as a regulation of "land use."279 The Court's brief and elusive
discussion on this point defies precise analysis, but the Court ap-
peared to assume the perspective of a landowner who would, under
traditional common law notions, enjoy broad discretion over develop-
ment decisions. From the common law perspective, the landowner
could be considered a "target" of the regulation. Viewed more
broadly, however, the landowner might benefit from substantive or
procedural protections embodied in the statutory regime. Recent de-
bates about statutory interpretation make clear that the relevant activ-
ity for Commerce Clause purposes is not self-defining. 280 A statute
does not emerge from the legislature with unitary targets, benefi-
ciaries, effects, or motives. Those designations are the work of the
Court, not the legislature. Such singular perspectives are not discov-
ered by the Courts, they are judicial constructs. The designation of a
particular perspective inevitably requires a choice. The post-Lopez
Court has neither provided an account of that choice, nor, more im-
portantly, has it justified why the Court, rather than Congress, gets to
make the choice.
278 See infra Part I.D.
279 See 531 U.S. at 173-74.
280 'See supra Part III.A.1 (exploring how finding a single purpose behind a law is
problematic).
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3. Judicial Incompetence to Glean a Single Relevant "Activity"
The Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause cases reveal a
Court searching for a single relevant commerce-linked activity for
each challenged law. How the Court decides which activity is constitu-
tionally relevant, however, is far from clear. As explained earlier in
this Article, statutes tend to be motivated and influenced by an array
of interests and to reflect compromise and ambiguity.281 By shaping
the rights and duties of people and entities in some respect touched
by an area of legislation, all law "regulates" both by influencing what
conduct is permissible and by influencing the degree of freedom or
protection offered by the regulatory intervention. 28 2 The Court nev-
ertheless has yet to assess self-critically whether it is capable of identify-
ing, in a principled manner, the single, relevant commerce-linked
activity in a given case. The Court's search for a single relevant activity
resembles techniques of statutory interpretation under which courts
select a general statutory purpose and resolve difficult interpretive is-
sues by reference to that general purpose. 28 3 Part III.A explained why
the search for a single purpose, a single activity, or a unidimensional
legislative focus is inappropriate in light of the more complex reality
reflected in the conceptual framework of the regulatory prism.
A second prong of criticism of purposive interpretation (and, typ-
ically, praise for textualist modes of interpretation) hinges on judicial
inability to make highly discretionary, interpretive judgments without
judges seeking to further their personal politics and preferences. Crit-
icisms of "dynamic" statutory interpretation, and a related debate en-
gendered by Jonathan Macey, reveal the perils of a Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in which judges pick only one relevant "activity" to de-
termine if a law passes constitutional muster.
William Eskridge's advocacy of "dynamic statutory interpretation"
hinges on the ability of judges to discern contemporary views of previ-
ously enacted laws and to resolve interpretive debates by updating stat-
utes to reflect contemporary understandings. 284 Eskridge argues that
judges should interpret a disputed statutory clause in part according
to "what it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our
present day society."285 Justice Scalia emphatically criticizes this ap-
281 See supra Part III.A.1-2.
282 Cf Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied injudi-
cial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (emphasizing the relational nature of legal rights).
Hohfeld states that allocating rights to one party necessarily creates duties that burden
another party. See id. at 30-31. Moreover, as legal realist thinkers have emphasized, the
allocation of rights and duties among parties reflects an exercise of state power, often
embodied in the common law. See Balkin, supra note 18, at 1123-25.
283 See supra Part III.A.I.
284 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48-80 (1994).
285 Id. at 50.
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proach, arguing that "[i]t is simply not compatible with democratic
theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and that
unelected judges decide what that is."2 8 6 John Copeland Nagle also
questions the appropriateness of dynamic statutory interpretation, as-
serting that a judicial inquiry into contemporary legislative prefer-
ences and social needs is too indeterminate and unfaithful to
democratic theory and to the rule of law. 28 7
Responding to Judge Easterbrook's call for courts to construe leg-
islation as contract and to enforce the interest group bargains actually
encapsulated in legislation, 288 Jonathan Macey supports a more dis-
cerning mode of judicial review that would enforce only the public-
regarding motives driving legislative action. 289 In Macey's view, most
legislation is a product of interest group bargains that, at best, incom-
pletely reflect or further public interests.29 0 Political rent-seeking is
the norm. Interest groups use government lobbying and other meth-
ods to exert pressure on the legislature and further their private inter-
ests, though laws will typically contain at least a declared public-
regarding purpose.2 91 Macey's proposed cure is that judges should
act as "filters through which public-regarding legislation passes undis-
turbed, while rent-seeking legislation is cast aside." 292 This argument,
however, assumes that judges can distinguish which purposes are pub-
lic-regarding and which derive from unsavory, special interest
motives.293
Macey's proposal, like Eskridge's dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion idea, provoked criticism rooted in concerns that judges would be
given excessive interpretive discretion. Despite the Macey proposal's
ostensible public-regarding purpose, Jerry Mashaw has condemned it
as 'judicial activism of a quite swashbuckling variety." 294 These criti-
cisms mirror arguments by Justice Scalia and others that reliance on
286 Scalia, supra note 223, at 22.
287 John C. Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209,
2221, 2237 (1995) (reviewing ESKRIDGE, supra note 284) (observing that "[t]he sources
from which a dynamic statutory interpreter may seek evidence of statutory meaning are
limited only by the interpreter's imagination").
288 See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
289 See Macey, supra note 217, at 225-27.
290 See id. at 230.
291 See id. at 203-31.
292 Id. at 228-29 (footnote omitted).
293 Macey's proposal stands in contrast to Judge Easterbrook's call for judicial enforce-
ment of the exact legislative bargain, regardless of the interests served. See supra notes
217-20 and accompanying text. Ironically, Macey questions the ability of courts to discern
the difference between "public interest statutes [and] special interest statutes," Macey,
supra note 217, at 239, suggesting that judges "are not investigative reporters," id.
294 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 123, 153 (1989); see also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group TheoiyJustify
More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48-66 (1991)(providing a more general
criticism of "efforts to use interest group theory to justify more intrusive judicial review").
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legislative history creates dangers of excessive judicial latitude and ju-
dicial policy making. 295
The Supreme Court exercises a similarly political and judgment-
laden power when it selects a single, constitutionally relevant "activity"
for purposes of its Commerce Clause analysis. In any piece of legisla-
tion, there are always numerous potential activities to consider. Chief
among them are the four basic attributes underlying legislation in the
regulatory prism construct: the political impetus for legislation, the
targets of the legislation, the beneficiaries of the legislation, and the
broader effects of the legislation. 296 The Court's recent unidimen-
sional approach to Commerce Clause analysis is as vulnerable to abuse
as the interpretive methods proposed by Eskridge and Macey in the
realm of statutory interpretation.
B. Statutory Construction and Constitutional Adjudication
The scholarship discussed in Part III.A.3 focuses on statutory con-
struction, not constitutional interpretation. Interpreting the Constitu-
tion differs in important ways from interpreting ordinary legislative
output. These significant theoretical distinctions, however, do not un-
dermine the relevance of the debates on statutory construction to this
Article's analysis of contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Indeed, in crucial respects, the constitutional context of our analysis
heightens concerns about judicial legitimacy.
1. Faithful Agents of the People
In construing statutes, courts generally try to act as the faithful
agents of the legislature. 297 Analysis of the legislative process, how-
ever, demonstrates the difficulty of that task. In particular, the com-
plexities of the legislative process undermine any attempt to interpret
a statute by reference to a unitary purpose, activity, target, or benefici-
ary.298 In construing the Constitution, courts generally attempt to act
as faithful agents of the people and to restrain the legislature when
necessary. The goal of constitutional judicial review is not to deter-
mine the will of the legislature, but to prevent that body from trans-
gressing the principles embodied in the Constitution. The ultimate
constitutional question is not, for instance, whether Congress in-
tended to prohibit development of wetlands, but whether the Consti-
tution grants Congress the power to exert regulatory authority over
such activity at all.
295 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 223, at 35-37.
296 See supra Part I.
297 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 216, at 5 & n.Il.
298 See supra Part III.A.
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To answer that ultimate constitutional question, though, the
court necessarily engages in statutory interpretation. The constitu-
tionality of the statute turns on its connection to Congress's power to
"regulate Commerce... among the several States." 299 Analysis of the
statute's text and its effects stands as an essential aspect of a Com-
merce Clause inquiry. Explorations of the legislative process demon-
strate the complexity of this interpretive task. The normative
implications of some scholarship should not cloud the overarching
descriptive message. Some commentators focus on legislators' sup-
posed hidden agendas and self-serving motives. 300 However, whatever
the motives of legislators, it is the legislative process that gives rise to
multiple, overlapping agendas. It is not the duplicity of legislators,
but the multidimensional nature of legislative processes and resulting
legislation that renders impossible the identification of singular mo-
tives, activities, targets, or beneficiaries. 30 1 Contemporary congres-
sional enactments have manifold and variegated effects. These effects
have important consequences for both statutory and constitutional in-
terpretation. Such dual implications inevitably follow from the nature
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As the constitutional inquiry
turns on analysis of the legislation, the intricate network of legislative
effects shapes the constitutional determination. The regulatory prism
reveals the inadequacy of a unidimensional approach to statutory or
constitutional interpretation.
Indeed, in one key respect, the risks of the Supreme Court's re-
cent unidimensional Commerce Clause analysis are far greater than
the risks in the statutory interpretation field. In construing a statute, a
court must make some choice among possible interpretive strategies.
The court has no alternative but to engage in the process of applying
the law. Mistakes are possible, but the court seeks to implement the
legislative command. In the Commerce Clause context, the Court
threatens to take a more devastating step than mere misguided analy-
sis of a statutory provision. In this constitutional setting, the Court has
used its unidimensional and judgment-laden selection of a single rele-
vant activity to invalidate in their entirety democratic assertions of fed-
eral legislative power.30 2 The only justification is judicial certitude
that the Supreme Court, in the interest of preserving a particular bal-
ance of federal and state authority, can select the correct activity for
the Commerce Clause analysis and, in turn, limit the reach of federal
legislative power. One need not unduly exalt the "counter-
299 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
300 See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 24.
301 See Shepsle, supra note 217, at 241-50.
302 See supra Part II.D.
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majoritarian difficulty" 3° 3 to note that such judgments displace cur-
rent democratic output to a greater extent than decisions construing
statutes.3
4
2. Purpose in Constitutional Adjudication
This Part does not focus on the search for legislative purpose in
constitutional adjudication. As discussed earlier in this Article, the
flaws in the Court's Commerce Clause approach stem not from a re-
ductionist quest for a legislative purpose, but from a different, albeit
related, reductionism: a unidimensional approach in designating a
single relevant activity as the subject of Commerce Clause scrutiny.30 5
A brief consideration of purpose in constitutional analysis, however,
highlights the problematic character of statutory interpretation tech-
niques that require ascription of a unitary statutory purpose. In con-
stitutional interpretation, the notion of legislative purpose has
remained relatively unaffected by the critical barrage deployed against
the concept in the statutory interpretation debates. The differing
fates of purpose in the constitutional and statutory contexts reflect
important distinctions in how the concept functions in the two realms.
Purpose remains a central concept in constitutional theory. In a
variety of areas, ranging from equal protection to free speech to free
exercise of religion, the constitutionality of legislation often hinges on
determinations of legislative purpose. 31 6 Indeed, scholars have sug-
gested that inquiries into purpose are playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in constitutional adjudication.3 117 Judges clearly understand
the pitfalls of relying on legislative purpose, -)S yet purpose tests
abound.
303 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF PoLrrics 16 (1962). Barry Friedman has provided a thorough, insightful intel-
lectual history of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. See generally Barry Friedman, The His-
tory of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty (pts. 1, 3-5), 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998), 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1383 (2001), 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000), 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
304 The Court's Commerce Clause approach is arguably even more vulnerable to
politicized judicial abuse than are the Eskridge and Macey models of statutory interpreta-
tion. Unlike dynamic statutory interpretation and judicial downplaying of interest-group
influences on legislation, the Court's approach is not even justifiable by reference to some
public-regarding ends.
305 See supra Parts 1I.D, III.A.3.
306 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297,
312-18 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 54, 71-73 (1997).
307 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 306, at 312; Fallon, supra note 306, at 90-91; see also
Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49
DUKE L.J. 1127, 1258 (2000) ("Tests turning on legislative motivation are in vogue ....").
308 See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 702-03 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the view that the "Court should consider only the
purpose the ... legislators actually sought to achieve" in enacting the challenged statute);
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) (noting that "it is extremely difficult for a
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Scholars cite several reasons for the persistence of purpose analy-
sis in constitutional law, including relative judicial competence to as-
sess ends rather than means, 30 9 the importance of purpose in
establishing social meaning,3 " l and the ability of purpose analysis to
mediate among competing jurisprudential theories.31 1 In short, pur-
pose tests can serve important functions, and in many situations are
better than any alternatives. For present purposes, though, we wish to
highlight a specific feature of constitutional purpose analyses: they
generally do not deny the existence of plural purposes. Constitutional
purpose tests usually acknowledge the multiple dimensions of legisla-
tion, and courts have devised frameworks for addressing that
multiplicity.
In its deferential mode, as when applying rational basis review
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Court notes
the variety of potential legislative purposes and simply asks if any pos-
sible purpose is legitimate and whether the challenged enactment is
rationally related to advancing this legitimate goal.3 12 Here, the
Court's acknowledgment of the broad range of potential legislative
purposes, along with an expansive sense of legitimate government
aims, grants substantial deference to legislative choices.3 13 This kind
of deferential due process review served as a model for the deferential
Commerce Clause approach that the Court adopted in Wickard v. Fi-
court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a
legislative enactment" (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383, 384 (1968))).
309 See Bhagwat, supra note 306, at 321-23; Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The
Role of Exclusionay Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 729 n.45 (1994)
("U]udicial review of legislative justifications and motives might well be the task judges are
most well positioned to perform."); see also Swaine, supra note 307, at 1258 (noting that
purpose tests are attractive "because they are thought to be more amenable to judicial
administration").
310 See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 753 (1998) ("For constitutional and other
purposes, it is a mistake to treat an action as independent from the reasons behind it, for
those reasons give actions their distinct social meanings."); see also Fallon, supra note 306, at
98 ("[W]e often cannot even characterize an act without understanding what motivated
it."); Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 64 (1997) ("The limits the Constitution
places on government may be understood not just in terms of minimizing certain sorts of
harms, but in ruling certain goals out of bounds for government altogether.").
311 See Fallon, supra note 306, at 100 ("[W]ith few exceptions, the purposes that are
held forbidden tend to reflect an overlap of, or consensus among, otherwise competing
constitutional theories." (footnote omitted)).
312 See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) ("Where, as
here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of
course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative
decision,' because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons
for enacting a statute." (citation omitted) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612
(1960))).
313 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-3, at 1443 (2d ed.
1988) ("Often only the Court's imagination has limited the allowable purposes ascribed to
government.").
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burn.3 14 With regard to both the Commerce Clause and the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the New Deal Court afforded Congress broad latitude in
setting national policy.31 5 In the Commerce Clause domain, that def-
erence appears to have dissipated substantially since 1995, replaced by
a more aggressive unidimensional review.
In adjudicating claims under the Equal Protection Clause of dis-
crimination against suspect classifications, the Court searches for for-
bidden purposes.3 "16  Again, the Court presumes a multiplicity of
potential legislative purposes, but in this context inquires whether a
prohibited purpose was among them. The Court does not ignore the
problem of ascertaining the relevance of potential purposes and has
developed a variety of doctrines to deal with the issue of multiple
motivations. 31 7 The Court, thus, has acknowledged the complexity of
the purpose inquiry and has tried to design tools to manage the diffi-
culties. Although the doctrinal niceties of constitutional purpose
analysis are beyond the scope of this Article, it is instructive that a
major reason for the Court's concern with purpose, as opposed to
mere effects, is that application of an effects-based test would re-
present a significant intrusion into the sphere of legislative preroga-
tive. 318 In contrast, a carefully constructed purpose analysis seeks to
protect legislative discretion. 3 19 The constitutional purpose analysis
that the Court has developed avoids the arbitrary and aggrandizing
characteristics of the Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It
314 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
315 See CUSHMAN, supra note 70, at 220-21 (noting that Justice Jackson contemplated
that Wickard would institute deferential rational basis review in the Commerce Clause con-
text on the deferential model of due process review set forth in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)).
316 See Pildes, supra note 309, passim (developing the concept of "'excluded reasons'
that cannot be the justification for government action" under constitutional jurispru-
dence); id. at 745-49 (applying this conception in the context of the Court's Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence).
317 See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("Discriminatory pur-
pose . . .implies . . . that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977). As the Court
in Arlington Heights noted,
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially
discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required invalidation of
the challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the
Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have re-
sulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.
429 U.S. at 270 n.21; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) ("The plaintiff's
burden is to show . . . that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's
decision ....").
318 See Fallon, supra note 306, at 85-86.
319 Indeed, some commentators have argued that the doctrinal emphasis on discrimi-
natory purpose affords too much deference to governmental actors. See, e.g., TRINE,
supra note 313, § 16-20, at 1509.
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is in the Commerce Clause arena that the Court manifests the kind of
reductionist approach to legislation criticized in recent scholarship on
statutory interpretation.3 20
IV
ATAVISTIC FEDERALISM, INDETERMINATE TESTS, AND AN
ANTIREGULATORY AGENDA
In its recent Commerce Clause cases, the Rehnquist Court's five-
Justice majority321 has revived a categorical approach to constitutional
challenges last seen in the Court's pre-193 7 Commerce Clause juris-
prudence. 322 Much as pre-193 7 distinctions among "manufacture,"
"commerce" and "affected with a public interest" were usually deter-
minative of constitutional challenges, the Rehnquist Court, as Part
II.D discussed, now has indicated that the economic versus non-eco-
nomic activity distinction is crucial, if not determinative. The Court
has not, however, acknowledged that the perspective it adopts in as-
sessing Commerce Clause challenges is usually the key interpretive
move informing its decisions. Part of the New Deal Court's rejection
of its pre-193 7 jurisprudence rested on the Court's realization that it
lacked a principled basis for determining the categorical distinctions
that underlay its second guessing of congressional action.32 3
The Rehnquist Court has revived an overlapping jurisprudence of
categories by (1) exclusively applying a three-part framework, (2) at-
tempting to distinguish between economic and noneconomic activi-
ties, and (3) characterizing areas of regulation as traditionally
committed to state supervision. By adopting a highly pliable approach
in determining what activities are important for constitutional analy-
sis, the Rehnquist Court is able to manipulate outcomes by selecting a
unidimensional and limited perspective on what activities are of con-
stitutional relevance. The result is a jurisprudence that appears for-
mal and somewhat mechanical, but in fact is premised on the Courts'
judgment-laden and nondeferential selection of a single, relevant ac-
tivity that often has insufficient links to commerce.
320 See supra Part III.A.
321 See supra note 215.
322 See supra Part 1I.B, D.
323 See CUSHMAN, supra note 70, at 169-70 (describing some of the Justices' dissatisfac-
tion with the Court's pre-1937 categorical approach to Commerce Clause analysis); id. at
214-22 (describing Justice Jackson's rejection of the pre-1937 Court's categorical Com-
merce Clause analysis). In the course of considering Wickard v. Filburn, Justice Jackson
wrote a memorandum to his clerk in which he emphasized the need for deference to
congressional judgments: "'We have all but reached an era in the interpretation of the
commerce clause of candid recognition that we have no legal judgment upon economic
effects which we can oppose to the policy judgment made by Congress in legislation."'
Id. at 217 (quoting Memorandum from Justice Jackson, to Mr. Costelloe (July 10, 1942)).
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This adoption of a unidimensional perspective, which empowers
the Court to make key judgments that controvert the political
branches' choices (often producing an antiregulatory effect), forms a
notable strain in the Rehnquist Court's recent jurisprudence. As this
Part demonstrates, by employing a limiting perspective, usually in the
form of special solicitude for the putative targets of regulation, the
Court derails regulatory goals in a variety of areas. This Part begins by
highlighting briefly the antiregulatory implications of the Court's re-
cent Commerce Clause innovations. It then turns to several other ar-
eas of public law in which the Court has deployed an analogous
approach and applied uncertain tests that purportedly lead to deter-
minate answers. In these domains, as well as in the Commerce Clause
area, the Court's narrow perspective has led to decisions with clear
antiregulatory implications.
A. Commerce Clause
In three recent Commerce Clause cases-Lopez, Morrison, and
SWANCC-the Rehnquist Court has selected a single perspective from
which to assess the adequacy of congressional power. In Lopez and
Morrison, the Court focused on the target activity prohibited by gov-
ernment regulation.3 24 In both cases, the Court reduced the focus of,
the statute at issue to a single prohibited activity. The Court in Lopez
characterized the Gun-Free School Zones Act as relating to "the pos-
session of a gun in a school zone. '3 25 In Morrison, the Court referred
to the law as focused on "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence,"
which the Court characterized as "not, in any sense of the phrase, eco-
nomic activity."'13 2 6 The Court found insufficient, indeed virtually irrel-
evant to its Commerce Clause analysis, the extensive legislative
materials revealing broad congressional concerns over both the sub-
stantial economic harms associated with such violence and the bene-
fits of federal regulatory intervention.3 27 In contrast, in SWANCC, the
Court's analysis shifted gears and logic. The Court acknowledged the
importance of defining the activity at issue under the relevant statu-
tory provision.3 28 However, the Court then downplayed both the ap-
parently commercial nature of operating a municipal landfill and the
broad commercial repercussions of protecting migratory birds using
the threatened wetlands. 329 Instead, the Court emphasized the envi-
ronmental protection aspects of the Clean Water Act and found the
324 See supra Part II.D.
325 See 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
326 See 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
327 See id. at 614-17.
328 See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
166-168 (2001).
329 See id. at 172-73.
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assertion of federal power tenuous.331 In all three cases, the Court
buttressed its analysis by generalizing each law's area of regulation
and characterizing the challenged provisions as implicating areas of
the "states' traditional and primary power," 33 infringing on domains
in which the states "'possess primary authority,' "332 or constituting a
clear federal usurpation of "the police power, which the Founders de-
nied the National Government and reposed in the States. 3 s3
These characterizations of the relevant activities and areas of reg-
ulation were far from inevitable. In Lopez, the Court could have fo-
cused on the business aspects of education, the business of guns or
even illegal guns, defendant Lopez's plan to sell a gun in the
school,33 4 or the many ripple effects of school quality and safety on
economic vitality. In Morrison, the Court similarly could have given
weight to the substantial documentation by the legislature of the mas-
sive commercial effects and economic harms associated with gender-
motivated violence and could have characterized the case as following
a substantial line of post-Civil War federal legislation intended to pro-
tect civil rights, rather than seeing the case as simply about "the police
power."335
SWANCC remains the most difficult of these cases to explain or
justify. Following the methodology of Lopez and Morrison, one might
have expected the Court to focus on the activity constrained or pro-
hibited. The target then would have been the activity of harming wet-
lands: either filling in general or the multiple municipality landfilling
plan at issue in the litigation. Unless the Court chose to use SWANCC
to revisit its "aggregation" approach to Commerce Clause analysis, the
330 See id. at 166-67, 172-74.
331 Id. at 174.
332 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (quoting Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
3-33 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
334 SeeFunk, supra note 147, at 10768 (noting that the Lopez Court "was uninterested in
the fact that Lopez had actually brought the gun to the school to deliver it to a person who
had purchased it" and that "the fact that Lopez was engaged in economic activity and
commerce when he violated the Gun-Free School Zones Act had no bearing on the case").
335 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-18. It would perhaps have been better if the Court
had not even insisted on some compiled documentation, but had instead made a simple
nod to the existence of similar information outside any kind of legislatively collected set of
materials. For a discussion of flaws in the judicially imposed requirement of legislative
documentation, see Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 1, at 119-35. The Court's attempt to
defend its method relied on the slippery slope argument that consideration of such effects
would afford plenary power to Congress. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; see also Lopez, 514
U.S. at 564 ("[1]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."). Contrary
to this assertion, rejection of a unidimensional approach need not constitute an abdication
of judicial review. See infra Part V; see also Shane, supra note 7, at 222-24 (criticizing the
Court's invocation of slippery slope arguments in Lopez and Morrison).
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case should have been easy.3 36 SWANCC is also troubling because of
the Court's insistence on interpreting the case and the Clean Water
Act as involving land use regulation, a function it characterized as
"'traditionally performed by local governments,', 3 3 7 rather than as an
example of federal environmental leadership in pollution control,
protection of biodiversity, or wildlife regulation. 338
In each of these cases, the result was to defeat the federal legisla-
ture's or agency's decision to provide a federal remedy. The breadth
of public concerns generating these challenged laws-violence
around schools, violence against women, and aggregate threats to wet-
lands and wetland-dependent wildlife-all were ignored by the Court.
The Court manipulated the perspective of its Commerce Clause analy-
ses to acknowledge as constitutionally relevant, not the full scope of
these broader public concerns, but rather a narrower perspective. By
generalizing each statute's goal, applying the narrow and unidimen-
sional perspective to the relevant activity, casting each law as imping-
ing on an area of traditional state primacy and choosing to focus on
an activity that made the assertion of federal power most tenuous, the
Court made each case appear preordained. A modest recasting of
each case and a broadened analytical perspective, however, could eas-
ily have led to contrary results, especially in Morrison and SWANCC.
The Rehnquist Court's return to earlier conceptions of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence and its particular jurisprudential method-
ology fit within the strong, atavistic, antiregulatory streak evident in
several other areas of the Court's jurisprudence. In these realms, the
Court has similarly adopted largely indeterminate criteria that evoke a
bygone era of reduced federal presence, a greater role for common
law courts, and a minimization of the activist regulatory state. 33 9 In all
of these areas, the Court's decisions have favored those who oppose
regulation. 340 The Court has once again shown special solicitude for
the "targets" of regulation, understood as the bearers of rights recog-
336 For an exploration of the aggregation principle and the related conception of a
"comprehensive scheme" principle in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see, for example,
Adrian Vermeule, Centralization and the Commerce Clause, 31 ENv-rL. L. REP. 11334 (2001).
337 See 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (quoting Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513
U.S. 30, 44 (1994)).
338 See id. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disputing the majority's assertion that the
case involved an area of traditional state control, and asserting that "the [Clean Water
Act] ... is a paradigm of environmental regulation ... [and] an accepted exercise of
federal power"); see also Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the
Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the
Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REv. 723, 773-80 (2002) (arguing that the legislation at issue in
SWANCC can be viewed as regulating in a realm of concurrent state and federal control).
339 See Shane, supra note 7, at 233 (noting that the current jurisprudential attitude
favors "those who reflexively oppose activist national government").
340 See supra Part I.D.
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nized at common law.341 The Rehnquist Court has shown no signs of
viewing itself as a partner assisting the legislature and executive agen-
cies in carrying out democratic choices.
For example, the Court's revived attention in federalism cases to
whether an area of regulation is one traditionally dealt with by state
governments similarly requires a highly discretionary analytical pro-
cess resulting in a single answer. Seldom has the Court in recent years
conceded an area of federal leadership or concurrent state and fed-
eral authority. Despite the Court's rejection in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority of its short-lived jurisprudence requiring
judicial determination of the question whether a law applied to a
traditional state government function, 34 2 the Court has once again ad-
ded a similar inquiry into its federalism decisions. 343 As discussed ear-
lier in this subpart, and strenuously argued by Justice Stevens in
dissent in SWANCC, judicial assertion that the Clean Water Act's wet-
lands provisions involved an area of traditional state primacy (land
use, rather than pollution control, wildlife preservation, or environ-
mental protection, all areas of arguable federal leadership or at most
concurrent state and federal domain) influenced the Court's dis-
torted reading of the underlying statute and the Court's own related
precedents.344 How the Court reaches its conclusion that a chal-
lenged law impinges on an area of claimed state primacy remains un-
clear, but the return to these pre-1937 analytical hurdles appears
likely to drive the Court's future forays into staLutory interpretation
toward reducing the reach of federal regulation.345
B. Lack of Deference to Administrative Agencies
The increasing prominence of textualist jurisprudence in the
Court's decisions is, as discussed earlier in this Article, usually justified
with reference to legislative primacy and the untrustworthiness of
judges. 3463 In its more recent applications, however, the Court's textu-
alist adherents have begun to use text-dependent interpretive modes
in a manner leading to judicial rejection of administrative agency in-
terpretations of law. The Court's interpretive framework for review-
ing agency interpretations of statutory law, announced in the oft-cited
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,3 4 7 for exam-
ple, was initially viewed as a vehicle to promote judicial deference to
341 See supra Part II.B, D.
342 See supra note 265.
343 See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
344 See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
345 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 265, at 640-46.
346 See, e.g., supra Part III.A.3.
347 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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agency interpretations of law. 348 Under the usually applicable defer-
ential "step two" mode of interpretation, reasonable agency interpre-
tations of a statutory gap or ambiguity were entitled to judicial
deference. 349 Recently, however, Justice Scalia, the Court's most vocal
textualist, has conceded that textualism leads him to afford less defer-
ence to administrative agencies: "One who finds more often (as I do)
that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering
requirement for Chevron deference exists."350 This expanded realm of
undeferential step one Chevron analysis means that, in the words of
Justice Scalia, it is "relatively rare that Chevron will require me to ac-
cept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not person-
ally adopt."351 The core assumption of step one is that the Court can
glean a precise meaning in statutory language and structure and,
therefore, that the agency interpretation must fall before a contrary
judicial view. Like its identification of a single relevant activity for
Commerce Clause purposes, the Court's fixation in Chevron analysis
on the concept of a unitary statutory meaning relocates authority to
the judiciary. The Court plucks one favored construction from the
many possible interpretations, denying the multiplicity of statutory
meaning, and applies an univocal approach that makes the judicial
interpretation final.3 52
348 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutoy Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Ad-
ministrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455 (1989) (describing Chevron as "an opinion
which endorsed deference in emphatic terms"); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Sepa-
rating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 188-89 (1992)
("Chevron ... accepts the legitimacy of broad congressional delegation, and warns the
courts that the delegation is not to them but to the democratically accountable agencies.");
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351,
353 (1994).
349 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
350 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 521. Thomas Merrill notes that, in Scalia's view, the combination of Chevron and
textualist interpretive methods that shun intentionalism leads to reduced agency interpre-
tive freedom. Merrill, supra note 348, at 354.
351 Scalia, supra note 350, at 521.
352 Cf RichardJ. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chi. v. Envtl. Defense Fund:
Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 15-19 (1995)
(describing ambiguities in a statute with respect to which the authors had successfully ad-
vanced a plain meaning argument in litigation). The Court in recent statutory interpreta-
tion cases has similarly avoided concessions of statutory ambiguity and concomitant
deference to agencies, choosing instead to interpret disputed provisions by drawing infer-
ences from other statutes' linguistic choices. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (construing the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as not authoriz-
ing FDA regulation of tobacco, based substantially on analysis of subsequent tobacco-regu-
lating statutes); W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-89 & n.4 (1991) (construing
a civil rights law regarding attorney's fee shifting as not including a right to expert costs
based primarily on a comparison of various statutes' handling of similar issues); see also
Buzbee, One-Congress Fiction, supra note 1, at 179-203 (analyzing numerous recent cases in
which the Court has interpreted statutes by such interstatutory comparisons of usage). By
1262 [Vol. 88:1199
2003] UNIDIMENSIONAL FEDERALISM 1263
C. Standing and the Review of Agency Actions
Recent Rehnquist Court changes in constitutional standing doc-
trine and preclusion of judicial review under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act have facilitated "slippage" in federal legislative regimes, as
those supporting enforcement and implementation of the law find
themselves disfavored in seeking access to the courts.35 3 Most notably
in the standing arena, four of the five Justices recasting Commerce
Clause doctrine have developed jurisprudence that explicitly provides
easy court access to putative "targets" of regulation, but requires
"much more" from "beneficiaries" of regulation, even if Congress has
provided an explicit cause of action under a citizen suit provision. 354
In this area, as well, the favored "targets" are holders of interests rec-
ognized at common law.35 5
The shift in this area has not been as stark as in the realm of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. For instance, Justice Kennedy's Lu-
jan concurrence,joined by Justice Souter, rejects the common law em-
phasis implicit in the Court's standing doctrine.356 In addition, a few
engaging in the "one-Congress fiction,"-that Congress drafts in an omniscient manner
and with awareness of other statutes' language choices-the Court engages in creative in-
terpretation to find a single acceptable meaning. This interpretive approach often denies
agencies discretion to resolve the language question in one of numerous potential ways.
See id.; see also Merrill, supra note 348, at 373 ("Having fewer tools to work with, the textual-
ist-like the painter working with a small palett[e]-necessarily has to become more imag-
inative in resolving questions of statutory interpretation.").
353 See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 297, 311-13 (1999).
354 For the most significant exegesis of this view, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992), in which the Court stated that, in cases in which an alleged injury results
from "allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is
needed," id. at 562. The Lujan Court explained that the more rigorous standing criteria
resulted from lower courts' difficulty in tracing and redressing injuries that stem from
"'unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts .... ' Id. (quoting
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 615 (1989)). For critiques of the Lujan decision, see,
for example, Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141 (1993); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as aJudi-
cially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 476,
484-85 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Ljan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, "and
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). For a pre-Lujan analysis of metaphors used in
standing analysis and the questionable historical roots of current standing frameworks, see,
for example, Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988). Probably the most insightful and influential exploration of
standing doctrine preceded Lujan by several years and anticipated many of the critiques of
Lujan cited above. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221
(1988).
355 See Sunstein, supra note 354, at 186-92.
356 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (KennedyJ., concurring) ("In my view, Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before .... (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)).
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recent cases have moved away from the common law emphasis evident
in Lujan and adopted a standing framework far more attentive to each
statute's structure, goals and incentives. 357 Nevertheless, the principle
announced in Lujan, which requires "much more" from regulatory
beneficiaries seeking to compel courts to ensure that the executive
branch complies with the law, remains controlling. 358 The uneven
standing test not only reduces the enforceability of regulatory
schemes in the courts, but also has an impact on the prior administra-
tive process. Following the courts' lead, administrative agencies afford
reduced attention to the arguments of regulatory beneficiaries and
heightened concern for regulatory targets who will later have easy
court access. 359 As noted by Cass Sunstein, the embrace of common
law baselines and emphasis on common law conceptions of injury are
"anachronistic revivals of pre-New Deal understandings of the legal
system." 3 60 The rise of the New Deal regulatory state "rendered the
distinction between regulatory objects and regulatory beneficiaries a
conceptual anachronism, a relic of the Lochner period."36'
Administrative Procedure Act doctrine under the "committed to
agency discretion" prong of judicial-review preclusion has likewise
been transformed in a manner disfavoring regulatory beneficiaries
and facilitating agency drift from legislative goals. The Court has
shown deference to agency decisions not to regulate. Although this
prong of review preclusion started as a narrow doctrine focused on
enabling act structure and language that leaves "'no law to apply,"' 3 6 2
it transmogrified into a body of doctrine focused on whole categories
of agency action that involve agency choices analogous to
prosecutorial discretion. Starting with Heckler v. Chaney's creation of
presumptive nonreviewability of agency nonenforcement decisions,363
the Court has expanded this "functional approach" to hold unreview-
able denials of petitions to reconsider, dismissals of security agency
employees, and budget allocation decisions that terminate existing
programs. 3 4 The Court has broadened the categories of unreview-
357 See Buzbee, Standing, supra note 1, at 262-71.
358 See supra note 354.
359 See Buzbee, supra note 19, at 768-73 (discussing how uneven standing criteria will
change underlying regulatory dynamics).
360 See Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 18, at 478 (discussing "doctrines that dis-
tinguish between regulatory beneficiaries and regulated industries" in the context of "hard
look" judicial review of administrative action).
361 Sunstein, supra note 354, at 188.
362 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting
S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). For a lucid exploration of the development of this
doctrine, see generally Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law,
74 MINN. L. Riv. 689 (1990).
363 See 470 U.S. 821, 831-35, 837-38 (1985).
364 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 184 (1993); Levin, supra note 362, at 691-92.
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able agency actions in the face of language in the APA calling forjudi-
cial review. 365
As argued by Justice Marshall in his concurrence in the judgment
in Heckler v. Chaney and further developed by Professor Sunstein, the
Court's assumption that agency failures to act are of lesser concern
fails to consider increased risks posed for intended beneficiaries of
regulation: the Court appears to ignore "the reality that governmental
refusal to act could have just as devastating an effect upon life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness as coercive governmental action."'3 66
The Court's solicitude for avoiding the placement of regulatory bur-
dens on the targets of regulation and failure to consider the needs of
beneficiaries once again reflects a pre-1937 conception of law and reg-
ulation. Common law interests and the absence of regulatory con-
straints are the presumptive baseline. Deviations from that baseline
are suspect. The result in the area of "committed to agency discre-
tion" review preclusion is, once again, that those seeking to avoid or
challenge imposition of regulatory constraints can seek to challenge
agency actions, but citizens concerned about agency failures to act are
presumptively unable to gain ajudicial audience. "Slippage" or "drift"
from legislative goals goes unchecked in the absence of specific viola-
tions of statutory mandates. 367
Although arising in the context of a standing dispute, the Court's
refusal to recognize standing or a ripe controversy in Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation3 68 reflects a similar disinclination of the Rehnquist
Court to deal with regulatory interventions gone awry. In this earlier
Lujan case, the plaintiffs alleged broad programmatic illegality,369 but
the very breadth of their allegations weakened their standing argu-
ment. The Court called for plaintiffs to seek recourse in the political
venues: "[Plaintiffs] cannot seek wholesale improvement of this pro-
gram by court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or
the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are nor-
mally made. '370 Broadly alleged illegality and inaction thus can be
365 See Levin, supra note 362, at 739-40.
366 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 851 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Re-
viewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 653, 664 (1985) (discuss-
ingJustice Marshall's concurrence in Heckler).
367 See Farber, supra note 353, at 311-19; see generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic
DWft, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on Macey, 8 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 111
(1992) (developing conceptions of political "drift").
368 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
369 See id. at 875, 879.
370 Id. at 891. In Justice Scalia's earlier scholarship, he argued explicitly that standing
doctrine should be utilized to allow past political choices lacking current support to fall
into desuetude. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. Rrv. 881, 896-97 (1983).
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unreviewable, while those subject to regulation invariably are pro-
vided recourse in the courts.
D. Common Law and the Commerce Clause
The Court's recent Commerce Clause innovations thus share at-
tributes with several rapidly changing bodies of public law. In each of
these areas, the Court has constructed approaches vesting it with sub-
stantial discretion, embraced analytical frameworks that result in sin-
gle judicially chosen outcomes, and shown little concern for ensuring
that legislatively chosen goals are fulfilled. The efforts of regulatory
beneficiaries to enforce the law encounter doctrines disfavoring their
pleas.
Changes in these other interpretive settings help to shed light on
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. With regard to the
Commerce Clause, the Court's common law orientation appears to
drive it to define the relevant issue at the narrowest, most individualis-
tic level. The image implicit in the Court's analysis is a state of nature
in which the individual exercises supposedly inherent rights and is
free, except as restrained by the intervening government. In asking
the Commerce Clause question, the Court frames the inquiry in terms
of the man 371 versus the government: the man is carrying a gun, the
man is acting violently, the man is working on his land. From this
narrow, atomistic perspective, none of the activities appears "commer-
cial." But, of course, the chosen approach substantially loads the
question. It is through interaction with others that people generally
engage in commercial activity or generate sufficient collective con-
cern to serve as the impetus for political intervention. To a large de-
gree, both commercial and political activity are distinguished by their
communal or collective character. 372 In each instance, one could sub-
stitute a communal focus, in which case the activities assume a much
371 The choice of the gendered term is purposeful. The defendants claiming immu-
nity from federal regulation in both Lopez and Morrison were, in fact, men. See United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602-04 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 551,
561-62 (1995). Further, in Morrison, the Court struck down a statute specifically designed
to provide equal rights to women. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 1755, 1759. For a discussion of
the potential significance of this aspect of Morrison, see Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court,
the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORD-IAM L. REV. 57,
135 (2002) (discussing competing characterizations of the Violence Against Women Act as
relating to criminal law, family law, or civil rights law); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947,
1035-44 (2002) ("When courts invalidate a federal law ... intended to secure equal citi-
zenship for women on the ground that the federal law interferes with state control over
domestic relations law, courts may well be perpetuating old common-law understandings
of marriage as the basis of citizenship in our constitutional order.").
372 See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF TI-E ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 456 (1961) (defining "commerce" as, inter alia, "a social intercourse: dealings be-
tween individuals or groups in society: interchange of ideas, opinions, or sentiments").
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more commercial cast. Lopez was not just carrying a gun, but was
intending to sell the gun and threatening other students' ability to
obtain an education. Morrison was not just engaging in violent acts,
but, by sexually assaulting Christy Brzonkala, was interfering with her
ability to function in society. SWANCC again most clearly demon-
strates the fictive quality of the Court's approach. The Solid Waste
Agency was not a person at all, but a collection of municipal corpora-
tions that undertook to build a commercial disposal site, the construc-
tion of which had many effects on the regional and national
economy. 37
3
The statutes in Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC reflected many moti-
vations and have impacts on many targets and beneficiaries. The
Court has replaced this diversity with a reductionist depiction of the
activity, portraying only an individual being constrained by the state.
From this unidimensional view, the statutes' connections to com-
merce appeared weak. The Court's narrow, individualistic focus oblit-
erates the social interconnection that constitutes economic activity
and creates the impetus for federal political intervention in the first
place. To the extent that the Court acknowledges its choice of a sin-
gle, privileged perspective, it defends that choice by reference to the
slippery slope. Unless its approach is adopted, the Court asserts, no
activity would lie beyond national regulation.37 4 Under this view, if
the Court were to move beyond its state-of-nature framework, eco-
nomic links appear everywhere and congressional power would be-
come plenary. Even if one accepts this slippery slope mode of logic,
however, the next Part of this Article demonstrates that the argument
fails. A court can abandon unidimensional, common law assumptions
and continue to exercise judicial review.
V
THE LEGISLATIVIST ANSWER
The regulatory prism speaks primarily to the kinds of connec-
tions that should constitute a sufficient nexus to commerce. 375 It does
not implicitly dictate a particular level ofjudicial scrutiny. This Article
argues that a singular focus on targets of regulation is erroneous. As
the Court recognized between 1937 and 1995, the commercial effects
of legislation, the commercial implications of an underlying problem,
as well as the commercial nature of the regulatory target, all could
373 See supra notes 148-63.
374 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("[I]fwe were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.").
375 See supra Part I.
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legitimate the exercise of national legislative power.376 The mul-
tidimensional approach of this period reflected a sound judicial mod-
esty, which acknowledged that courts are poorly situated to do more
than recognize the usual multiplicity of ways in which laws address a
social need or seek to effect change, often with a commerce nexus.
If courts are ill suited to discern a single, relevant activity linked
to commerce, much as they are ill suited to discern a single overriding
or public-regarding statutory purpose,3 77 the logical question that fol-
lows is whether one can derive a principled mode of Commerce
Clause judicial review, or whether Congress should in effect be the
judge of the validity of its enactments. Many scholars have supported
the idea of using political, rather than judicial, safeguards to enforce
limits on congressional authority grounded in federalism concerns.3 78
The current Court, however, has decisively rejected this position.
Such a judicial abdication would require an analytical reversal of Lo-
pez, Morrison, and SWANCC. The Rehnquist Court's federalism juris-
prudence contemplates some judicial reviewing role in assessing the
sufficiency of legislation under the Commerce Clause. This Part,
therefore, develops an approach that retains a role for judicial review,
but which better accommodates the multidimensional aspects of
legislation.
This Part stands as a refutation of the Court's slippery slope argu-
ments. In justifying its restrictive approach to interpreting the Com-
merce Clause, the Court has asserted the need to find some limits on
federal authority. The Court has rejected a variety of arguments
about the commercial nexus of challenged enactments by asserting
that such arguments, if accepted, would lead inevitably to a concep-
tion of plenary federal power.379 In other words, a theory that vali-
dates any congressional enactment, the Court believes, is inherently
flawed. Nor has the Court been willing to accept the political safe-
guards of federalism as adequate protection of the doctrine of enu-
merated powers. The Court has insisted that federalism must be
judicially enforceable, not simply a matter of legislative grace. 380 As
developed in this Part, we reject the false dichotomy between adop-
376 See supra Part II.C.
377 See supra Part III.A.
378 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS,
175-84 (1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954).
379 See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
380 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 551, 557 n.2 (1995)).
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tion of a unidimensional perspective and abandonment of judicial
review.
Accepting the modality of judicial review that we discuss would
not require an explicit rejection of the Court's stated approach. The
Court has yet to explain what factors courts should examine for pur-
poses of Commerce Clause analysis. Nor has the Court yet elaborated
a method for determining the relevant activity in its Commerce
Clause analysis. Given the absence of any transparent Court exposi-
tion of its own methodology, one must examine the Court's mode of
decision for any guidance. SWANCC suggests methodological vacilla-
tion over whether the Court should examine the target's activities, the
beneficiaries' links to commerce, the broader legislative motivations,
or the law's general category of regulation. 38' Although the Court has
implicitly adopted a unidimensional perspective, it has not explicitly
rejected a broader framework. In sum, doctrinal space exists for an
approach to judicial review that rejects unidimensionality.
This Article suggests an approach that we denominate the legisla-
tivist answer to this central Commerce Clause question. The legisla-
tivist answer is that close but deferential scrutiny of Congress's
handiwork-the text of a challenged statute-should guide Com-
merce Clause "activity" analysis. The Supreme Court's recent cases
adopting the unidimensional perspective (and lower courts applying
these recent precedents) arbitrarily focus on only one potentially rele-
vant "activity" implicated by the challenged legislation. 38 2 The focus
has typically been on what this Article's regulatory prism discussion
refers to as the regulatory target, generally considered as the common
law rights holder subject to intrusive government intervention. At
other times, the Court has focused on beneficiaries, and seldom, if at
all, has the Court examined the broader commercial effects of federal
regulatory intervention.
To anchor the courts' analysis, this Article proposes a simple
touchstone for Commerce Clause analysis: a statute's text should
guide the courts. This proposal constrains the courts by limiting their
choice of relevant "activities." It also forces the courts to acknowledge
multiple, constitutionally relevant activities and the complex goals,
compromises, and purposes that pervade legislation. 383 This legisla-
tivist solution draws support from other areas of law, in particular the
law of standing, in which a constitutional test-the existence of a
381 See supra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
382 See, e.g., supra Part I.D-F.
383 Cf supra Part IIl.A.1 (discussing the problems of finding a single purpose behind a
law).
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"case" or "controversy" under Article III-requires careful attention to
the relevant statutory scheme. 38 4
A. Applying the Legislativist Approach
In cases in which a litigant challenges federal legislation by assert-
ing that the law lacks a sufficient commerce link, the courts should
examine the statutory text in the following manner. Findings and
purpose provisions that are found early in most statutes provide a fully
presented and enacted view of what the legislature and President
deemed to be the underlying reasons for the legislation. If these pro-
visions identify harms, benefits, or activities that motivate the enacted
legislation, those identified concerns are undoubtedly "activities" that
should be considered as potentially sufficient to justify legislation.
This approach does not mean that findings or purpose provisions are
required. Findings or purpose provisions can, however, serve to alert
courts to the activities and concerns that motivated the legislature..3 85
Similarly, if laws explicitly identify classes of activities, people, or
entities that are the object of legislative concern (be it legislative con-
demnation or solicitude), then courts evaluating constitutional suffi-
ciency should add these activities, people, or entities as among the
potential justifying bases for federal action. Finally, operative provi-
sions seldom contain explanations of their purpose, but by their func-
tioning implicitly identify both the targets and beneficiaries of
behavior constrained by the federal law. These implicit beneficiaries,
targets, and effects of regulation should also be added to the list of
potential justifications for the challenged legislation. If, individually
or in the aggregate, there exists a tenable commerce link, and if Con-
gress has identified that link, the reviewing court's constitutional
analysis should be complete.
This approach means that the courts would be exercising a level
of scrutiny somewhat more rigorous than a fully deferential, rational
basis review. Courts would not supply their own hypothetical com-
merce links if Congress does not identify somewhere in the enacted
legislation a relevant goal, person, or entity as a target or beneficiary,
or somehow reveal the underlying problem or effect motivating the
legislation. Courts thus would be limited in their ability selectively to
384 See infra Part V.B,
385 For discussion of the role of findings in constitutional adjudication, see Philip P.
Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United
States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and
Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
757 (1996); HaroldJ. Kren t, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Proriety of Requifing Legis-
lative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 731 (1996); Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister:
Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil
War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 337 (1984).
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ignore activities implicated by the legislation; to paraphrase the famil-
iar refrain about abuse of legislative history, courts would no longer
be able to pick out their statutory friends from the crowd.38 6 Courts
would also, however, be constrained in their ability to manufacture a
Commerce Clause rationale if Congress has failed to make its motiva-
tions apparent.
The result of the legislativist approach is to retain a limited judi-
cial role in checking federal legislation, but to render judicial review
deferential to the legislature's enacted laws. The onus would be on
Congress to clarify the basis of its authority. However, if challenged
legislation were to articulate or reveal a commercial nexus, the Court
would not second guess Congress's determination of commercial mo-
tives, targets, benefits, or effects, unless that congressional determina-
tion did not survive rational basis review. This legislativist approach
recognizes the Constitution's grant of Commerce Clause authority to
Congress and Congress's duty to discharge its constitutional obliga-
tions faithfully. Congress, as well as the Court, is responsible for vindi-
cating constitutional values.
Several commentators have endorsed the notion that the Court
should focus on the congressional deliberative process or statements
of commercial nexus, rather than independently scrutinize legislative
connections to commerce. 38 7 In his dissent in Morrison, Justice Breyer
suggested review of the legislative process as a preferable alternative to
the Court's scrutiny of the commercial character of the regulated ac-
tivity.388 The legislativist approach this Article outlines accords with
these theories,38 9 but offers one attribute rendering it arguably more
386 See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Judge
Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the equivalent of enter-
ing a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends.").
387 See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV.
795, 799-800 (1996) (arguing for review focused on legislative deliberative process); Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
2180, 2240-41 (1998); see also Engdahl, supra note 65, at 782 ("[T]he Constitution entitles
the people to have their electorally answerable political organs actually and openly inquire,
debate, compromise, and resolve whether and how far it is necessary to reach matters oth-
erwise beyond the national government's scope, in order to effectuate enumerated federal
powers."); Lessig, supra note 9, at 207-08 (suggesting the possibility of a clear statement
rule as an alternative to the Court's approach in Lopez); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for
Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1364 (2001) ("Process federalism's central insight
is that the federal-state balance is affected not simply by what federal law is made, but by
how that law is made.").
388 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 663 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
389 Stephen Gardbaum and VickiJackson rest their theories in part on interpretations
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Gardbaum, supra
note 387, at 807-19; Jackson, supra note 387, at 2235-45. That clause does lend textual
support to the more expansive interpretations of congressional power in the post-New Deal
period. Moreover, the language of the post-New Deal cases suggests that they drew on
conceptions of congressional power previously developed in the context of the Necessary
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workable than Justice Breyer's legislative process review. Delving into
materials that purport to reveal the legislative process will reflect only.
portions of the inputs into the legislative process and, as in the
Court's recent unidimensional approach cases, will give courts broad
latitude to choose what to examine or find sufficient.39°1 A more text-
based approach calls for a far narrower analysis and is confined to the
scope of the statutory provisions actually enacted.
Scholars have raised two important sets of objections to modes of
judicial review that impose heightened drafting or process burdens on
Congress. The criticisms can generally be characterized as complaints
about too much or too little judicial oversight. First, some scholars
argue that forcing Congress to specify statutory purposes or motives
represents an unjustifiable judicial intrusion into the legislative pro-
cess.39 1 Indeed, some who argue that Congress should be required to
articulate the constitutional basis of legislation tend to view such a
proposal as only a second-best solution, preferable to rigorous sub-
stantive review, but less desirable than a fully deferential rational basis
test.
3 9 2
and Proper Clause. See Gardbaum, supra note 387, at 807-10. For the past fifty years,
though, courts have not emphasized the Necessary and Proper Clause in vindicating exer-
cises of congressional authority. See id. at 810. The legislativist framework we advance does
not require reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause. The approach recommended
by this Article relies on broader structural and institutional principles regarding the alloca-
tion of governmental decision-making authority. It is not clear that a general theory of the
Necessary and Proper Clause will yield more determinate standards for deciding cases such
as Lopez, Morrison, or SWANCC. Further, the source of the standard does not appear criti-
cal. The main weapon deployed by the Court in its decisions construing the Commerce
Clause narrowly is not the text of the Clause, but instead the slippery slope argument that
there must exist some limits on congressional power. See supra note 374 and accompanying
text. Whatever the force of an argument based on a general conception of enumerated
powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause adds little by way of refutation. If it cannot be
the case (because of some larger structural principle) that the Commerce Clause gives
Congress plenary power, as the Court has stated, then it cannot be the case that the Com-
merce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause combined give Congress plenary
power.
390 See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 1, at 146-48 (describing the scope of judicial
discretion and potential for judicial abuse available in a process that permits courts to
select the materials to be considered in legislative record review).
391 See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 328, 376-83 (2001) (discussing the constitutional illegitimacy of the Court requiring
Congress to record the basis of its actions); Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1330-32 (1999) (discussing the perils of requiring Congress to estab-
lish the constitutional basis of its legislation).
392 In his dissent in Morrison, for example, Justice Breyer discussed the possibility of
requiring evidence that Congress had considered its constitutional authority. Morrison, 529
U.S. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Ultimately, however, he reaffirmed his support for the
traditional rational basis approach, which imposes no such obligation on Congress. See id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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These critics point out legitimate practical and theoretical
problems with judicial regulation of the legislative process. However,
what this Article suggests is far less rigorous than a clear statement
rule or a mandate for explicit legislative identification of purposes or
findings.393 Instead, the legislativist approach calls for courts to ex-
amine the multiple facets of a legislative text to discern what activities
are relevant to the legislation and, accordingly, to a Commerce Clause
challenge. Under this approach, Congress would not need to be ex-
plicit or unusually clear in legislative drafting; it would merely need to
reveal in the statute's various provisions those activities implicated by
the legislation. Analysis of legislative text to identify people, entities,
motivations, and effects relevant under the challenged law should en-
able courts to identify a broader and more defensible array of consti-
tutionally relevant commerce-linked activities.
Second, some argue that deference to congressional identifica-
tion of a Commerce Clause nexus renders judicial review nugatory. 394
More persuasive, however, are the arguments of scholars who insist
that, in view of the mechanics of the legislative process, a requirement
of congressional articulation would place a meaningful limit on con-
gressional authority. 395 The need to specify the commercial nexus
would require Congress to consider the commercial implications of its
legislation and perhaps to reject proposals with an insufficient con-
nection to commerce. Rules that influence how Congress legislates
inevitably influence what Congress legislates.
But, this objection continues, can Congress reach any activity as
long as it claims to find a commercial connection? And, given the
integrated nature of the national economy, cannot a plausible com-
mercial nexus always be asserted? Is the scope of congressional power
limited only by the scope of congressional imagination?396
Under our approach, the commercial connection that Congress
articulates must be rational. The statute must have a rational connec-
tion to commerce when viewed from some perspective. Judicial re-
view may not be stringent under this approach, but it exists. Does it
remain possible that, if it really wants to regulate an activity, Congress
always could fabricate a rational commercial connection? Perhaps,
393 See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 265, at 623-25.
394 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 385, at 763-64.
395 See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 265, at 597 (discussing clear statement rules
as a practical way for the Court to force congressional attention to constitutional values);
Young, supra note 387, at 1387-90 (defending legislative process review as a meaningful
form ofjudicial review, but also asserting a need for substantive review); see also Bradford R.
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1427 (2001)
(stating that "clear statement" rules serve to ensure that "federal lawmaking procedures
perform their intended function").
396 We thank Robert Pushaw for pressing this point upon us.
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but that kind of objection seems misplaced. If the commercial nexus
is rational, then the Constitution grants the authority to Congress.
That result follows from the Constitution's basing congressional
power on a concept such as commerce, the scope of which may evolve
over time. Moreover, the objection rests on an underlying assumption
of congressional bad faith. In the end, constitutional interpretation is
dangerous business: it is not clear that the greater danger lies with the
possibility of congressional rather than with judicial overreaching.
Courts applying vague, manipulable standards based on the slippery
slope argument that some limits are necessary present grave dangers
of judicial overreaching. 3 v9 7 Those perils seem at least as great as any
presented by the legislativist framework we advance.
B. Precedents and Analytical Analogs for the Legislativist Answer
Although the post-New Deal Court did not explain its increas-
ingly deferential Commerce Clause review in terms identical to this
Article's proposed legislativist answer, the multiple ways in which the
Court found that legislation passed muster are consistent with this
proposed methodology. Moreover, the increasingly stringent review
exercised by the Rehnquist Court has never included a methodologi-
cal explanation that precludes consideration of the statutory complex-
ity this Article describes in its regulatory prism discussion. 398 Indeed,
in SWANCC, the Court was troubled by the commerce justifications for
the Clean Water Act as applied to wetlands used by migratory birds,
but it did not strike down the legislation on Commerce Clause
grounds, and even noted a late litigation suggestion that the targets'
harmful activities were appropriate subjects of Commerce Clause con-
sideration. '9 9 Arguments from approximately fifty years of precedent
support the legislativist answer. No Supreme Court decision has ex-
plicitly explained its methodology in a manner that precludes the ap-
proach suggested here.
This Article's proposal-that close but deferential textual analysis
should guide a court's constitutional inquiry into the sufficiency of
397 In debates over the revival of the delegation doctrine, critics of revival question the
prudence of handing such a substantial and inherently political role to the courts in light
of "the absence ofjudicially manageable and defensible criteria to distinguish permissible
from impermissible delegations." Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 323, 324 (1987); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political
Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REV. 469, 521 (1985) (arguing that judges are inca-
pable of distinguishing between "a legislative body's failure to resolve a policy dispute not-
withstanding its best efforts to do so and a legislative refusal to make a policy decision that
is motivated by lack of political will," and that they "inevitably would substitute their pre-
ferred resolutions of... policy disputes").
398 See supra Part I.
399 See Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001).
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links to commerce-has two analytical analogs, both drawn primarily
from administrative law doctrine. The Court's recent standing opin-
ions provide the most obvious analogy. 40 0 In 1992, the Court ap-
peared to adopt a common law concept of "injury in fact" for statutory
injuries made actionable by a citizen suit provision.401 However, sub-
sequent cases have made clear that Justice Kennedy's critical concur-
rence (joined by Justice Souter) in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
represented what is now a settled view of the Court.4' 2 Although inju-
ries akin to those recognized at common law will suffice to establish
standing, that key Lujan concurrence recognized that Congress re-
tains authority to articulate "new rights of action that do not have
clear analogs in our common-law tradition. ' 40 3 Supreme Court cases
decided during the past few years have made clear that court analyses
of injuries, causation, and redress, for purposes of constitutional
standing, are all heavily determined by the universe of interests and
incentives created by a statute. 40 4 This Article similarly calls for Com-
merce Clause analysis that is largely shaped and confined by the un-
derlying statutory text.
Two related doctrines pertaining to access to judicial review now
manifest a similar close judicial analysis of statutory findings, purpose,
and operative provisions. Prudential "zone of interest" standing analy-
sis for causes of action under the Administrative Procedure Act is ex-
plicitly rooted in the text of the relevant statute.40 5 Much as this
Article proposes in its legislativist answer to the Commerce Clause "ac-
tivities" question, courts recognize citizen standing to challenge regu-
latory action regardless of whether the litigant is "protected or
regulated" by the law. 40 6 Moreover, it does not matter if a person is
seeking to expand or reduce the reach of the law. If the law protects a
party or constrains the source of a harm, both are within the statutory
"zone" unless subject to another preclusion argument. 40 7 Determin-
ing who is within this statutorily relevant zone requires analysis of a
statute's provisions to determine the people, entities, and goals be-
hind the statute.40
400 See supra Part IV.C.
401 See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
402 See Buzbee, Standing, supra note 1, at 258-59, 266, 279.
403 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
404 For development of this analysis of standing doctrine, see Buzbee, Standing, supra
note 1, at 258-59, 266, 279.
405 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997).
406 Id. at 163-71.
407 Id. at 163-67.
408 Id. at 174-76.
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The mode of analysis utilized in Block v. Community Nutrition Insti-
tute4°9 provides further support for the textual analysis this Article sug-
gests. In Block, the Court had to determine if consumers could sue in
connection with a regulatory milk marketing and pricing decision
where the statute granted suppliers and handlers an explicit regula-
tory role and review rights. 41 ° Based on its parsing of the underlying
statute to determine who was meant to be able to sue, the Court con-
cluded that consumers could not bring a challenge. 41t The Court
found that an analysis of text and operative provisions made it "fairly
discernible" from the statutory scheme that Congress did not intend
to grant consumers recourse to the courts.41 2
This Article calls for a mode of judicial analysis of statutory lan-
guage and operative provisions similar to that applied in Bennett and
Block, but used here to discern the constitutionally relevant actors, ac-
tions, motivations, and effects for purposes of Commerce Clause anal-
ysis. Although this approach would undoubtedly still require the
exercise ofjudicial judgment, attention to this approach's broader ar-
ray of factors reduces the discretion wielded by courts that might oth-
erwise select only a single activity for purposes of Commerce Clause
analysis. Expanding the breadth of relevant provisions and activities
that courts must consider would act to confine judicial exercises of
discretion, thereby reducing opportunities for ends-oriented, manipu-
lative judicial selection of the perspective for assessing legislation.
CONCLUSION
Commerce Clause review inevitably requires courts to choose a
perspective, or perhaps multiple perspectives, in their examination of
challenged legislation. Courts seek to discern through that examina-
tion some activity or activities that are sufficiently linked to commerce
to justify the assertion of federal power. The Court's shift since 1995
to a unidimensional approach is a reductionist interpretive move,
which privileges one perspective and one activity as constitutionally
relevant. The more complex legislative process we explore in the sug-
gested regulatory prism schematic illuminates how the Court's cir-
cumscribed search for a single relevant activity fails to acknowledge a
predictably far more complex legislative reality. Furthermore, the ju-
dicial search for a single relevant activity in challenged legislation
stands in substantial tension with critiques of purposive statutory inter-
pretation, particularly the sound assertion that laws tend to have mul-
tiple purposes and to reflect political compromises. Whether in the
409 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
410 See id. at 341-42.
411 See id. at 345-48.
412 See id. at 348, 352.
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context of constitutional analysis or statutory interpretation, laws typi-
cally reflect a multiplicity of goals and cannot be reduced to being
"about" a particular purpose or activity. This Article's call for a more
deferential mode of judicial review that incorporates a multiplicity of
perspectives into Commerce Clause review does not lead to judicial
abdication of the courts' constitutional role. Instead, the legislativist
answer calls for judicial attention to the challenged text to discern
what societal ills, goals, targets, beneficiaries, and activities are impli-
cated by the challenged law. If any of these multiple perspectives, as
gleaned through statutory analysis, reveals a sufficient commerce link,
the court should reject the Commerce Clause challenge. Any other
reductionist mode of review that ignores the more complex fabric of
modern legislation fails to show adequate regard for the work of the
legislative branch.
